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ABSTRACT
This paper surveys research on social capital. We explore the concepts that motivate the social
capital literature, efforts to formally model social capital using economic theory, the econometrics
of social capital, and empirical studies of the role of social capital in various socioeconomic
outcomes. While our focus is primarily on the place of social capital in economics, we do consider
its broader social science context. We argue that while the social capital literature has produced
many insights, a number of conceptual and statistical problems exist with the current use of social














marcel.fafchamps@economics.oxford.ac.uk…in every community there seems to be some sort of justice, and 
some type of friendship, also. At any rate, fellow-voyagers and 
fellow-soldiers are called friends, and so are members of other 
communities.  And the extent of their community is the extent of 
their friendship, since it is also the extent of the justice found 
there…What is just…is not the same for parents towards children 
as for one brother towards another, and the same for companions 
as for fellow-citizens, similarly with the other types of 
friendship…what is unjust towards of these is also different, and 
become more unjust as it is practiced on closer friends.  It is more 
shocking, e.g., to rob a companion of money than to rob a fellow-
citizen, to fail to help a brother than a stranger, and to strike one’s 
father than anyone else.  What is just also naturally increases with 
friendship, since it involves the same people and extends over an 
equal area. 
 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, 9.61 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
Social capital represents one of the most powerful and popular metaphors in 
current social science research.  Broadly understood as referring to the community 
relations that affect personal interactions, social capital has been used to explain an 
immense range of phenomena, ranging from voting patterns to health to the economic 
success of countries.  Literally hundreds of papers have appeared throughout the social 
science literature arguing that social capital matters in understanding individual and 
group differences and further that successful public policy design needs to account for the 
effects of policy on social capital formation. 
This paper is designed to survey research on social capital.  We will give primary 
focus to the role of social capital in economic growth and development as suggested by 
the presence of this paper in the Handbook of Economic Growth.  That being said, this 
survey will discuss social capital in general as there is no part of the social capital 
literature that may plausibly be treated as orthogonal to the issues that arise in relating 
social capital to economic growth.  Our objectives are threefold.  First, we provide an 
overview of conceptual issues that underlie social capital studies.  Second, we identify 
  1some general flaws we see in the empirical social capital literature.  While we would 
hardly claim that every social capital study suffers from these problems, we do claim that 
they are prevalent in the literature.  Third, we make a number of recommendations on 
how to strengthen the social capital literature. In assessing empirical work, we will focus 
almost exclusively on statistical analyses of social capital. This is not because we regard 
qualitative studies as unimportant (we will in fact advocate their greater use in the course 
of our discussion) but because such studies raise very distinct conceptual and 
interpretative questions from their quantitative counterparts. 
Much of our discussion is critical. We argue that empirical social capital studies 
are often flawed and make claims that are in excess of what is justified by the statistical 
exercises reported. However, this should not be taken as an indictment of research on 
social capital per se.  In our judgment the role of social factors in individual and group 
outcomes is of fundamental importance in most of the contexts in which social capital has 
been studied.  Hence we regard the empirical social capital literature as addressing major 
outstanding issues in many areas of social science. Our intent in this survey is to evaluate 
what is currently known and to make suggestions on how to improve future research. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a discussion of how 
economists and other social scientists have attempted to define social capital. The section 
also reviews some of the contexts in which social capital has been argued to play an 
important causal role in various sociological outcomes.  Section III discusses efforts to 
theorize about social capital; both heuristic and conceptual arguments are discussed as 
well as formal analyses.  Section IV discusses econometric issues that arise in the efforts 
to develop empirical evidence of the role of social capital as a determinant of 
socioeconomic outcomes.  Section V reviews the empirical literature on social capital; 
while this literature is far too large to cover comprehensively we believe our survey 
captures the range of contexts in which social capital effects have been evaluated.   
Section VI reviews empirical studies that analyze the determinants of social capital.   




  2II.   Social capital: basic concepts 
 
II.i. Defining social capital 
 
Since Loury (1977) introduced it into modern social science research and 
Coleman’s (1988) seminal study placed it at the forefront of research in sociology, the 
term social capital has spread throughout the social sciences and has spawned a huge 
literature that runs across disciplines. Despite the immense amount of research on it, 
however, the definition of social capital has remained elusive.  From a historical 
perspective, one could argue that social capital is not a concept but a praxis, a code word 
used to federate disparate but interrelated research interests and to facilitate the cross-
fertilization of ideas across disciplinary boundaries. The success of social capital as a 
federating concept may result from the fact that no social science has managed to impose 
a definition of the term that captures what different researchers mean by it within a 
discipline, let alone across fields.
1  
While conceptual vagueness may have promoted the use of the term among the 
social sciences, it also has been an impediment to both theoretical and empirical research 
of phenomena in which social capital may play a role.
2  In order to anchor our discussion 
of social capital, we need a substantive definition. We begin our search by listing a 
number of definitions that have been proposed by some of the most influential 
researchers on social capital. We begin with Coleman (1990) who defines social capital 
as: 
 
                                                           
1Even if a precise definition of social capital were attempted, it is likely to be no less 
vague than other similar concepts. The term capital, for instance, is used to describe 
different things – from finance to machinery to infrastructure. Human capital similarly 
has many different meanings, such as education, nutrition, health, vocational skills, and 
knowledge. This kind of vagueness, however, is less problematic as long as researchers 
agree on some basic principles. 
2 Criticisms of the vagueness and inconsistency of various definitions of social capital 
may be found in Dasgupta (2000), Durlauf (2000), Manski (2000) and Portes (1998).  
Arrow (2000) goes so far as to suggest that the term social capital be abandoned. 
  3…social organization constitutes social capital, facilitating the 
achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or 
could be achieved only at a higher cost. (pg. 304) 
Putnam et al (1993) provides a similar characterization, 
…social capital…refers to features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society… (pg. 167) 
 
Both definitions emphasize the beneficial effects social capital is assumed to have on 
social aggregates.  According to these definitions, social capital is a type of positive 
group externality. Coleman’s definition suggests that the externality arises from social 
organization. Putnam’s definition emphasizes specific informal forms of social 
organization such as trust, norms and networks. In his definition of social capital, 
Fukuyama (1997) argues that only certain shared norms and values should be regarded as 
social capital: 
Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain 
set of informal rules or norms shared among members of a group 
that permits cooperation among them. The sharing of values and 
norms does not in itself produce social capital, because the values 
may be the wrong ones… The norms that produce social capital… 
must substantively include virtues like truth-telling, the meeting of 
obligations, and reciprocity.  (pp. 378-379) 
 
 
Other definitions characterize social capital not in terms of outcome but in terms of 
relations or interdependence between individuals.  In later research, Putnam (2000) 
defines social capital as 
...connections among individuals - social networks and the norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.  (pg. 19) 
 
Ostrom (2000) writes 
  4Social capital is the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, 
rules and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of 
individuals bring to a recurrent activity.  (pg. 176)  
 
In a similar vein Bowles and Gintis (2002) state 
Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one’s associates, 
a willingness to live by the norms of one’s community and to 
punish those who do not. (pg. 2) 
 
Finally, one finds in a recent book-length treatment, Lin (2001) 
…social capital may be defined operationally as resources 
embedded in social networks and accessed and used by actors for 
actions.  Thus, the concept has two important components:  (1) it 
represents resources embedded in social relations rather than 
individuals, and (2) access and use of such resources reside with 
actors. (pp. 24-25)  
 
 
From these definitions, we can distinguish three main underlying ideas: (1) social 
capital generates positive externalities for members of a group; (2) these externalities are 
achieved through shared trust, norms, and values and their consequent effects on 
expectations and behavior; (3) shared trust, norms, and values arise from informal forms 
of organizations based on social networks and associations. The study of social capital is 
that of network-based processes that generate beneficial outcomes through norms and 
trust.  
By this definition social capital is always desirable since its presence is equated 
with beneficial consequences. This formulation is quite unsatisfactory from the 
perspective of policy evaluation (e.g., Durlauf (1999,2002b), Portes (1998)): if one denies 
the appellation of social capital to contexts where strong social ties lead to immoral or 
unproductive behaviors, there is nothing nontrivial to say in terms of policy. Presumably 
it is social structures, not their consequences, which can be influenced by policymakers. 
  5Unless we know under what conditions social structures generate beneficial outcomes, 
we cannot orient policy.  We also note that the benefits that social capital generates for 
one group may disadvantage another, so that the combined effect on society need not be 
positive. We come back to this issue later. 
The three main ideas outlined above often appear intertwined in the mind of their 
proponents so that one in isolation would probably not be considered social capital. For 
instance, there are many phenomena that generate positive (or negative) externalities. 
According to the definitions listed here, they would probably not be considered social 
capital unless they involve norms or trust. There appears to be more confusion as to 
whether all three parts of the definition are required for social capital. Norms and trust 
can be based on formal institutions such as laws and courts without reference to social 
networks. Yet the literature sometimes has referred to such generalized trust as social 
capital (e.g., Knack and Keefer (1997)). It is also unclear whether (1) and (3) alone 
constitute social capital. In his seminal work on job markets, for instance, Granovetter 
(1975) discusses how social networks are activated to share job market information, 
thereby speeding job search and raising the efficiency of the job matching process. This 
process does not, by itself, require shared norms or values. Fafchamps and Minten (2002) 
use the phrase ‘social network capital’ to describe this phenomenon. 
From the perspective of empirical work, a definition of social capital limited to 
(1) and (2) is problematic. Things like ‘norms’ and ‘shared values’ are notoriously 
difficult to measure. This has led some of the less rigorous work in this area to present 
evidence of a beneficial group effect as evidence of social capital itself, and consequently 
to conclude that social capital is good. This kind of circular reasoning is of course not 
satisfactory since it is ultimately tautological and is not falsifiable. 
A definition of social capital suitable for rigorous empirical work must identify 
observable variables that can be used as proxies for social capital (Portes (2000)). Norms, 
trust, and expectations of behavior are very broad ideas that encompass no end of 
phenomena. Identifying a commonly acceptable set of proxies for social capital has 
therefore proved a formidable task and many different variables have appeared in 
empirical papers purportedly to measure it.  Another problem has to do with the extent to 
which the variables used identify well defined social influences – part (3) of our 
  6definition.  Adherence to norms can be induced for many reasons, including many that 
cannot be reasonably construed as social. Consequently, evidence of adherence to norms 
does not, by itself, constitute evidence of the importance of social networks. To the extent 
that social networks and associations are part of the definition of social capital, evidence 
must also be provided that trust and shared norms are achieved via social interaction 
based on interpersonal networks and associations.  
  
II.ii The efficiency of social exchange 
 
Perhaps a more fruitful approach for our purpose is to proceed by example, that is, 
to select one specific phenomenon and use it to illustrate how research on social capital 
can be organized. Much of the commonality in definitions of social capital and in 
examples given by respective authors is the focus on interpersonal relationships and 
social networks and their effect on the efficiency of social exchange – whether the 
provision of a public good, as in Coleman’s work, or the better organization of markets, 
as in Granovetter’s. At the heart of the concept of social capital is the idea that positive 
externalities cannot be achieved without some kind of coordination, i.e., there is 
coordination failure. Much of the interest in social capital stems from efforts to 
understand how socially efficient outcomes can occur in environments in which the sorts 
of conditions necessary for the classical First Welfare Theorem are not fulfilled.   
Efficiency of social exchange is thus a good vantage point around which to organize our 
assessment. 
One important potential role for social capital concerns its ability to ameliorate 
potential inefficiencies caused by imperfect information.  As Hayek (1945) was among 
the first to point out, information asymmetries are an inescapable feature of human 
society. As a result, exchange is hindered either because agents who could benefit from 
trade cannot find each other, or because, having found each other, they do not trust each 
other enough to trade. In either case, some mutually beneficial exchange does not take 
place. Similar principles apply to the provision of public goods. Search and trust are thus 
two fundamental determinants of the efficiency of social exchange. If we can finds ways 
of facilitating search and of fostering trust, we can improve social exchange.  
  7There are basically two ways of achieving these dual objectives: via formal 
institutions (e.g., a stock exchange or a trading fair) or via interpersonal relationships 
(e.g., word-of-mouth communication of opportunities, repeated interactions which benefit 
both parties). The literature on social capital focuses principally on the latter. In the 
following discussion, we illustrate how social networks can raise efficiency. We begin by 
examining the possible effects of social networks on search. In so doing, we focus only 
on parts (1) and (3) of our definition of social capital since norms and trust are not central 
to the circulation of information (although they can play a subsidiary role). We then turn 
to trust, the externalities it generates, and the way to sustain trust through social 
networks. Public goods are discussed in the following sub-section. The relationship 
between social capital and economic development is examined next. The last sub-section 
explores the relationship between social capital and equity.  
 
Social networks and search 
 
The role of social capital in search can be illustrated by comparing US equity and 
labor markets. Given the existence of a stock market, it is very easy for a seller of stock 
to find a buyer at the market clearing price. This is not the case in labor markets where no 
equivalent institution circulates accurate and up-to-date information about jobs and 
workers. In his path-breaking study of the US labor market, Granovetter (1975) brought 
to light the role played by interpersonal relationships in channeling information about 
jobs and job applicants. A large proportion of jobs are allocated on the basis of personal 
recommendation and word-of-mouth. This can be understood as an endogenous, 
spontaneous adaptation to the absence of a formal clearing house equivalent to the stock 
market.
3  
As this comparison demonstrates, observing that social capital plays a role in 
markets does not, by itself, constitute evidence that social capital is necessary and should 
                                                           
3 This is not to say that efforts have not been made to emulate the stock market model – 
from employment offices to internet sites to temporary employment agencies. But to date 
none of these institutions seems capable of conveying sufficiently precise information 
about jobs and job applicants, especially regarding worker environment, work ethics, and 
  8be nurtured. Depending on the circumstances, the development of formal institutions may 
be a superior alternative. 
 
Social capital and trust 
 
As argued in Fafchamps (2004), trust may be understood as an optimistic 
expectation or belief regarding other agents' behavior. The origin of trust may vary.
4 
Sometimes, trust arises from repeated interpersonal interaction. Other times, it arises 
from general knowledge about the population of agents, the incentives they face, and the 
upbringing they have received (Platteau (1994a,b)). The former can be called 
personalized trust and the latter generalized trust. The main difference between the two is 
that, for each pair of newly matched agents, the former takes time and effort to establish 
while the latter is instantaneous. 
In most situations, trusting others enables economic agents to operate more 
efficiently – e.g. by invoicing for goods they have delivered or by agreeing to stop 
hostilities. Whenever this is the case, generalized trust yields more efficient outcomes 
than personalized trust. The reason is that, for any pair of agents, generalized trust is 
established faster and more cheaply than personal trust. This observation has long been 
made in the anthropological literature on generalized morality. Fostering generalized trust 
can thus potentially generate large efficiency gains. How this can be accomplished, 
however, is unclear. 
Clubs and networks are different concepts having to do with the structure of links 
among economic agents. Clubs describe finite, closed groupings. Networks describe 
more complex situations in which individual agents are related only to some other agents, 
not all. The term ‘network’ is sometimes used to describe the entire set of links among a 
finite collection of agents. Other times, it is used to describe the set of links around a 
specific individual. To avoid confusion, we refer to the second concept as a subjective 
network. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
personal motivation. See Fafchamps (2002) and Kranton (1996) for models of 
spontaneous market emergence organized around interpersonal relationships. 
4 Sometimes trust is misplaced, but for the sake of brevity, we ignore this possibility here. 
Put differently, we assume rational expectations. 
  9Among other things, clubs and networks can be used to describe the extent to 
which personalized and generalized trust exist in a population. Perfect generalized trust 
corresponds to the case where all agents belong to a single club (or complete network) 
and trust all other members. Situations in which generalized trust exists only among sub-
populations (say, Jewish diamond dealers in New York, cf. Bernstein (1992)) could be 
described as small clubs. Situations in which individual agents only trust a limited 
number of agents they know individually can be described as a network. 
From the above discussion, it is immediately clear that if trust is beneficial for 
economic efficiency, the loss from imperfect trust can be visualized as the difference 
between the actual trust network and the minimum network that would support all 
mutually beneficial trades. Following this reasoning, inefficiency is expected to be 
highest in societies where the trust network is very sparse (Granovetter (1995)). 
Inefficiency is also large when sub-groups who could benefit a lot from trading with each 
other are prevented from doing so by mutual isolation. This is true even if many links 
exist within each sub-group. 
 
Social capital and public goods 
  
In the preceding sub-section we discussed the role of trust in fostering exchange. 
Trust is also an essential ingredient in the delivery of public goods. In many cases, the 
state can organize the provision of public goods by taxing individuals. Whenever this is 
true, trust is not essential. But there are many forms of public goods that cannot be 
harnessed through state intervention.  
In his work on PTA run schools, for instance, Coleman (1988) shows that parental 
involvement in school affairs has a beneficial external effect on student achievement, 
probably because it leads children to believe their parents care about their education. 
Parental involvement, in turn, requires trust to reduce and solve interpersonal conflicts 
and to minimize fears of free-riding. In this example, the externality is a public good that 
cannot be harnessed by state intervention. Voluntary participation by parents is essential. 
In poor countries, there are many situations in which the state could, theoretically, 
intervene to provide a public good, but where it is unable to do so because its tax base 
  10and its capacity to organize are limited. Collective action can serve as a substitute for the 
state. However, because it cannot rely on the coercive power of the state (e.g. the ability 
to tax and enforce contracts), collective action is much harder to set in motion. Two 
essential ingredients are then required: leadership and trust. A leader is required who is 
capable of convincing community members that they should voluntarily contribute to the 
public good. Trust is necessary to resolve conflicts among competing interests and to 
reduce fears of free-riding. Leaders can also help raise the level of trust in the 
community. 
What the above discussion indicates is that delivering public goods via voluntary 
organizations depends critically on local trust and leadership. If these ingredients are 
absent, for instance after a civil war, then state intervention is likely to be much easier. 
Furthermore, good local leaders are rare. Projects that work well in one place because of 
strong local involvement need not be replicable elsewhere if local leaders are weak. Pilot 
projects of public good delivery through local communities may provide wrong signals if 
their placement is correlated with the presence of good local leaders who managed to 
attract the pilot project to their community. 
 
II.iii Social capital and development 
  
Much of the interest in social capital stems from the view that the absence of 
social capital represents one of the major impediments to economic development; 
Woolcock (1998) provides a wide ranging conceptual analysis of the role of social capital 
for developing societies and economies; a range of applications of social capital to 
economic development are collected in Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) and Grootaert 
and van Bastelear (2002),.  In fact, much of the current interest in social capital stems 
from the now classic book by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) which argues that 
Northern Italy developed faster than Southern Italy because the former was better 
endowed in social capital -- measured by membership in groups and clubs.  One of the 
major claims in this literature is that social capital can facilitate the solution of collective 
action problems. 
  11However, when focusing on advanced societies, the effects of social capital on 
economic performance are less obvious.  For example, Putnam (2000), focusing on the 
U.S. experience since the 1950's, argues that social capital, defined as membership in 
formal and informal clubs, has declined monotonically since the 1950’s. This is true for 
all states, all decades, and all measures of social capital. However, he finds no 
relationship between the speed of the decline of social capital and economic performance 
across U.S. states or across time periods.  Further, the relationship between social capital 
and socioeconomic outcomes is even harder to characterize when one looks at 
subperiods.  For example, the 1990's were a period of rapid economic growth in the U.S. 
yet it is also a period of rapid decline in social capital, at least based on the sorts of 
measures he uses. To be clear, Putnam does attempt to associate higher social capital with 
better socioeconomic outcomes, our point is that the relationship between the two for the 
United States is even at first glance relatively complicated.  
The differences between the case of Italian regions and that of the United States is 
suggestive of how one might think about the relationship between development and 
social  capital.   One interpretation of these differences is that for the United States, 
generalized trust has improved over the period studied, so club membership has become 
less necessary.
5  In contrast, the Italian experience relates to an earlier period in which 
generalized trust may have been insufficient or incomplete and small clubs helped 
broaden the range of personalized trust. This raises the general possibility that clubs and 
networks are important at intermediate levels of development. Their function is to 
broaden the range and speed of social exchange beyond the confines of inter-personal 
trust. But once a sufficiently high level of generalized trust has been achieved, clubs and 
networks are no longer necessary and wither away (North (2001)).  A similar kind of 
reasoning can be followed for public goods. In undeveloped economies, the state is weak 
                                                           
5 In this discussion, we stipulate that Putnam’s claims about declining U.S. social capital 
are correct.  In fact, this claim has been subjected to important criticism. Skocpol (1996), 
has argued, for example, that while participation in local groups has declined, 
participations in larger organizations such as the American Association of Retired 
Persons has increased, and that what really needs be understood is the nature of voluntary 
group memberships and the like, rather than the number of memberships per se.  See 
Skocpol (2003) for a detailed elaboration of this idea. One important implication of 
  12and under-funded. Consequently it cannot organize the delivery of all needed public 
goods.  This is particularly true for local public goods or for public goods that require a 
modicum of voluntary involvement to limit free-riding (of which corruption is but one 
manifestation). 
Social capital provides an alternative. Clubs formed for non-economic purposes 
(e.g., religious worship) have leaders. In the absence of public good provision by the 
state, these leaders may decide to mobilize club members (e.g., the religious 
congregation) to provide missing public goods. History is replete with examples of faith-
based organizations intervening to build schools and clinics and to provide a variety of 
public services. Here, sharing a common religious fervor is the basis for trust and the 
religious hierarchy provides the necessary leaders. Some large secular organizations have 
adopted similar practices – e.g., political parties yesterday, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) today.
6
These issues have immediate implications for empirical work on social capital. 
The difficulty comes from the fact that first-best outcomes can in principle be achieved 
without paying attention to clubs and networks. Generalized trust in commercial 
contracts, for instance, can theoretically be achieved via laws and courts. Because of the 
possibility that revenues may be collectively raised via taxation, public goods can in 
principle be organized by the state at lower cost in terms of public mobilization and 
leadership skills. As North (1973,1990) has argued, the rise of the Western world is 
precisely due to the invention of institutions that protect property rights and make the 
state more effective at delivering public goods. Clubs, networks, and community-based 
voluntary organizations can improve efficiency in economic exchange and public good 
delivery. But these are typically second-best solutions. The first-best approach is 
generally to develop well-functioning legal institutions and state organizations.
7
                                                                                                                                                                             
Skocpol’s work for economists is that many of the measures that have been proposed to 
quantify social capital may be fundamentally flawed. 
6One classic historical example is the role of the Social Democratic Party in organizing a 
range of social and cultural activities for its members in Imperial Germany, see 
Blackbourn (1997, chapter 8). 
7Bowles and Gintis (2002) elaborate this type of reasoning, although in their view social 
capital plays a role in overcoming limits to government intervention generated by 
  13Whether or not social capital raises efficiency we therefore argue depends on the 
level of institutional development. Suppose that laws and courts are insufficient to ensure 
respect of commercial contracts. This situation can arise anywhere (Bernstein (1996)) but 
it is probably most severe in poor countries where many transactions are small and buyers 
and sellers are too poor for court action to yield reparation (Bigsten et al. (2000), 
Fafchamps and Minten (2002)).
8 In such an environment, market exchange relies on a 
combination of personalized trust, legal institutions (e.g., to enforce large contracts and to 
punish thieves), and informal institutions (e.g., reputation sharing within business 
networks and communities). Whether or not social capital facilitates exchange can then 
be seen as a test of the strength and reach of formal institutions. 
A similar line of reasoning holds for public goods.  Public good delivery is best 
accomplished when the power of the state to tax and mobilize resources is combined with 
trust and community involvement. The reason is that, without voluntarily accepted 
discipline, government action is ineffective: taxes do not get paid, rules are not followed, 
civil servants become corrupt, and free riding reigns. Discipline in turn depends on the 
perceived legitimacy of government action and the degree of public involvement in the 
decision-making process. It also depends on identification with the political elites, sense 
of national urgency, and many other factors which are still poorly understood. The 
bottom-line, however, is clear: without some form of voluntary acceptance by the public, 
government efforts to provide public goods are likely to fail. Social capital is thus 
probably essential for public good delivery. But the forms it may take are likely to vary 
depending on local conditions, i.e., from generalized trust in government and formal 
institutions to interpersonal trust mobilized via clubs and networks. 
 
II. iv. Social capital and equity 
  
We have argued that trust is essential to both economic exchange and public good 
delivery. We have also argued that clubs and networks can facilitate search and provide 
                                                                                                                                                                             
information constraints and so acts as a complement to government institutions in 
producing efficient outcomes. 
8Except through forced labor, as in 19th century England and France. But this is now 
outlawed in most countries. 
  14an imperfect substitute to generalized trust: in the absence of generalized trust, it may be 
necessary to rely on clubs and networks. Unlike generalized trust, however, clubs and 
networks often have distributional consequences that may be quite inequitable. The 
reason is that, unlike generalized trust, clubs and networks only offer a partial or uneven 
coverage of society. If the benefits of social capital principally accrue to network 
members, those who happen to be included benefit from increased efficiency but those 
that are excluded are penalized. As Fafchamps (2002) and Taylor (2000) have shown, the 
creation of clubs or networks can even penalize non-members. This is because members 
of a club or network find it easier to deal with each other and, as a result, may stop 
dealing with non-members.
9  
Clubs are least conducive to equity when membership is restricted to a specific 
group (e.g., men or whites) or when new members are not accepted (e.g., established 
firms only). Even when new members are accepted without restriction, historical events 
can shape the composition of clubs for decades whenever entry is slow. In this case, 
equal opportunity need not be realized because old members have enjoyed the benefits of 
membership for much longer. By extension, clubs are likely to have undesirable 
consequences on equity whenever (1) club membership is beneficial to members and (2) 
entry into the club is not instantaneous. Put differently, clubs raise equity concerns 
whenever they have real economic benefits. 
The creation of clubs may thus reinforce polarization in society between the ‘in’ 
group and the ‘out’ group. Investing in social capital by promoting clubs can thus have 
serious equity repercussions. This is true even if we ignore the fact that certain clubs may 
collude to explicitly dominate or exclude others (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan). A similar 
situation arises with networks because better connected individuals profit from their 
contacts (Fafchamps and Minten (2002)). Social capital can be used by certain groups to 
overtake others, generating between-group inequality and political tension. To the extent 
that between-group inequality itself favors crime and riots and deters investment, 
promoting social capital by promoting specific groups may, in the long-run, be 
counterproductive. 
                                                           
9 Of course, this is not to say that impersonal markets based on generalized trust treat all 
groups fairly. Statistical discrimination, for instance, naturally arises even in the absence 
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III. When does social capital matter? 
 
The conceptual discussion has clarified the definition of social capital and its possible 
role in the development process. This discussion, however, has not precisely identified 
the conditions under which social capital matters. To achieve this, we need a general 
conceptual framework in which there is room for social capital to be beneficial. 
 
III.i   Sources of inefficiency 
 
  For social capital to increase Pareto efficiency, the decentralized equilibrium 
without social capital must not be Pareto efficient in the first place. Social capital can 
only have a beneficial effect in a second-best world.  Deviations from first-best outcomes 
arise for a variety of reasons including externalities and free-riding, imperfect 
information and enforcement, imperfect competition, and the like. For social capital to be 
beneficial, it must therefore resolve or compensate for one of these sources of 
inefficiency. Secondly, whatever the source of inefficiency, there are only a limited 
number of ways by which social capital – or any other mechanism – may improve upon a 
decentralized equilibrium. First, it may resolve a coordination failure in an economy that 
has multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Second, it may alter individual incentives so as to 
replace the decentralized equilibrium with a superior one. Third, it may affect the 
technology of social exchange, for instance by opening new avenues for the circulation of 
information.  
From these two preliminary observations, it is immediately obvious that social 
capital will never be the only possible solution to inefficiency. There always exist 
alternative mechanisms to solve coordination failure, improve individual incentives, and 
upgrade the technology of social exchange – such as contracts, vertical integration, state 
intervention, or redefinition of property rights. Of course, there are many circumstances 
in which social capital is a less expensive or simpler institutional solution, but it is 
important to recognize that it can never be the only one.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
of clubs and networks (e.g. Fafchamps (2003)). 
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investigation. Suppose social capital improves efficiency by solving a coordination 
failure problem. For this to occur, the economy must have multiple Pareto-ranked 
equilibria. Social capital provides the leadership or coordination device necessary to 
select a superior equilibrium among the many possible ones. Suppose further that the 
researchers have multiple observations of such economies, some with social capital and 
some without. Since nothing precludes these economies from achieving a high 
equilibrium without social capital, it is inherently difficult to test its effect. Furthermore, 
social capital may arise endogenously as an institutional response to an inferior 
equilibrium. To the extent that social capital does not always succeed in moving the 
economy to the better equilibrium, one could have the paradoxical situation in which 
economies with social capital are on average at a lower equilibrium than those without. 
This is a standard difficulty with multiple equilibria but it is not always adequately 
recognized in empirical work. 
Even when there is a single equilibrium, social capital never is the only possible 
way of improving efficiency by altering incentives or technology. Identifying the effect 
of social capital requires that the researcher adequately control for other possible 
institutional solutions. Here too, self-selection is a concern. 
 
III.ii   Channels 
 
  The literature has identified a number of channels by which social capital 
improves efficiency. Most of these channels fall under one or a combination of the 




It is a commonplace that human beings derive satisfaction from interacting with 
others. Socializing often involves the transfer of information, even if the purpose of 
socialization is not to transfer this information. The sharing of information is then a by-
  17product of social interaction, a Marshallian externality. To the extent that the shared 
information is economically useful, socialization generates a positive externality. 
Socialization may also be initiated with the intent of acquiring a specific piece of 
information. In this case, the transfer of information is the purpose of socialization. 
Because interacting with others is also a consumption good, collecting information 
through socialization benefits from a kind of ‘subsidy’ relative to non-social forms of 
information collection (e.g., going to the library).  
The literature on social capital contains many applications of this simple idea. 
Barr (2000), for instance, argues that social networks among Ghanaian entrepreneurs 
serve to channel information about new technology. Fafchamps and Minten (1999), 
Granovetter (1975,1995), Montgomery (1991), Rauch and Casella (2001) and many 
others have emphasized the role of business networks in conveying information about 
employment and market opportunities. Fafchamps (2004), Greif (1993), Johnson, 
McMillan and Woodruff (2000), Kandori (1992) and McMillan and Woodruff (2000) 
have brought to light the role of social networks in circulating information about breach 
of contract, thereby enabling business groups to penalize and exclude cheaters. Wade 
(1987, 1988) discusses the role of social capital in reducing incentive problems in teams 
by circulating information about effort. This point has also been made in the theoretical 
literature on industrial organizations, where the possibility for members of a team of 
workers to monitor and penalize each other has been shown to increase efficiency.  Social 
capital may also circulate information about what tasks need to be done and when. 
Platteau and Seki (2002) provide an illustration of this idea in the case of Japanese 
fishermen and the coordination of their fishing efforts to minimize cost (e.g., exchange 
information about fish location) and maximize revenue (e.g., coordinate the landing of 
fish to maximize prices). 
While the evidence provided is impressive, the literature remains somewhat naïve 
in its assumption regarding the ease with which accurate information can be exchanged.  
In practice, three conditions must be satisfied for social capital to raise Pareto efficiency 
through the sharing of information: (1) imperfect information must be the source of 
inefficiency; (2) there are disincentives to spread erroneous information; (3) there are no 
obstacles to Pareto efficiency other than imperfect information. Even if social capital 
  18satisfies the first condition, it may not satisfy the other two. It is also important to 
recognize that the information sharing benefits generated by social capital can always be 
obtained in another way. For instance, information sharing can be explicitly organized 
and budgeted within a large organization, whether public or private (enterprise, NGO). 
To empirically test the effect of social capital, one should control for the possible 
presence of such organizations. 
It is so customary to blame imperfect information for economic inefficiency that 
other sources of inefficiency, such as imperfect contract enforcement and insufficient 
protection of property rights, are sometimes disregarded. Fafchamps (2002), for instance, 
shows how the decentralized enforcement of contracts naturally takes the form of 
relational contracting, even without exchange of information. In this example, contract 
enforcement is the channel through which social capital raises efficiency, not information 
sharing. In his analysis of market institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, Fafchamps (2004) 
points out that incentives often exist to distort the conveyed information, either to hurt a 
competitor or to hide one’s own shortcomings. Interviews with entrepreneurs suggest that 
gossip is never regarded as reliable information. Guaranteeing that accurate information 
is transferred through social networks requires the existence of punishment mechanisms – 
such as the loss of reputation – penalizing false reporting. Finally, there often are 
obstacles to Pareto efficiency other than imperfect information. The most common one is 
coordination failure. We revisit this issue below. 
 
Group identity and modification of preferences 
 
Under the general heading of group identity and modification of preferences, we 
put various effects that arise because identification with a group or network affects 
individual preferences and choices. Economists usually regard individual preferences as 
exogenously given and relatively stable over time. As psychologists have shown, 
however, individual preferences can be manipulated through advertising or propaganda. 
Individual preferences can also fluctuate over time in a systematic, somewhat predictable 
fashion. Impulses are one particularly relevant example of such phenomenon. Individuals 
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eat, to drink, to buy.  
This introduces time inconsistency in preferences. Because agents anticipate they 
may be subject to impulses, they often resort to various ‘tricks’ that limit their future 
choices – such as putting money on a savings account that cannot be accessed easily, or 
carrying a limited amount of cash when shopping. Agents may also voluntarily enter in 
restrictive social arrangements in order to protect themselves against their own impulses. 
Alcoholic Anonymous is a good example of such a process. Participation in Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) can similarly be understood as a way of 
forcing oneself to save.  
The literature on social capital is replete with descriptions of such virtuous 
processes. Because these descriptions implicitly assume that social capital alters 
individual preferences, they often seem alien to economists. One such claim often made 
in the literature is the idea that social capital favors altruism and raises concerns for the 
common good – the ‘touchy-feely’ side of social capital. To see how even a minor 
increase in altruism can raise efficiency, consider a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) 
game with standardized payoff matrix: 
 
 Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate (1,1)  (-a,b) 
Defect (b,-a) (0,0) 
 
with  ,  . It is standard that (Defect,Defect) is the unique Nash equilibrium. Now 
suppose that players become altruistic, so that their utility is the weighted sum of their 
individual payoff   and their opponent’s individual payoff 
0 a > 1 b >
i Π j Π , so that 
() 1 ii U j α α =− Π + Π  where  0 α > . In this case, Defect is no longer necessarily a best 
response strategy; (Cooperate,Cooperate) is now a Nash equilibrium if  () 11 ba α α >− − 






. This condition can be satisfied for values of α  well below 
one half, implying that, depending on the values of a and b, even moderate levels of 
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games with inferior equilibria, such as the assurance game: in these games some altruism 
can also eliminate Pareto inferior outcomes. The intuition behind this result is obvious: 
the more players internalize others’ payoffs, the more they care about Pareto efficiency. 
When both players give equal weight to their payoff and others’, they only care about 
aggregate welfare, what we call the common good. In this case, the equilibrium is always 
Pareto efficient.
10  Altruism provides an efficient solution to free-riding – a principle that 
most religions seem to have discovered centuries ago.  
The relationship between altruism and social capital probably has to do with 
group identity (Akerlof and Kranton (2000)). Economic experiments using the dictator 
game and the trust game indeed suggest that agents exhibit more altruism and play more 
cooperatively if they have been induced to identify with a group (e.g., Fershtman and 
Gneezy (2001)).
11 This is true even if members of the group are unknown and even if 
they are not even seen during the experiment. These results suggest that group 
identification may trigger agents to adopt more altruistic preferences, thereby yielding 
more efficient group outcomes. If identification with a group is necessary for preferences 
to become more altruistic and better aligned with the common good, efforts to foster a 
sense of community may naturally be seen as an essential component of social capital by 
many researchers. This probably explains why community building is often construed as 
a way to foster social capital. 
Social capital may also affect preferences in other ways. As argued by Fafchamps 
(1996) and Platteau (1994a), several mechanisms can be used to enforce contractual 
obligations: legal and extra-legal penalties, loss of reputation, and guilt. These same 
mechanisms can enforce contributions to the public good in case individual preferences 
are not aligned with the common good. By circulating information, social capital can 
magnify reputational sanctions, a point we have discussed in the previous sub-section. 
Group identification can also raise guilt for acting against the group’s common interest. 
                                                           
10 Note that the common good equilibrium is Pareto efficient in both the original, selfish 
preferences   and in the altruistic preferences  i Π ( ) 1 ii U j α α = −Π + Π . 
11 In the trust game players play sequentially. Player 1 gives an amount X to player 2. 
This amount is multiplied by the researcher, usually by 2 or 3. Player 2 then gives an 
amount Y to player 1. There is no repetition. 
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with guilt, call it g, from the payoff b associated with defection. If this feeling is strong 
enough so that  , defection is deterred. Since Max Weber, the literature on market 
development has emphasized the role played by religion in fostering business honesty 
(Ensminger (1992), Geertz, Geertz and Rosen (1979), Poewe (1989)). Communist work 
ethics propaganda can be seen as a similar effort to improve team performance by raising 
guilt among shirkers. 
1 bg −<
By favoring identification with a group, social capital may also affect preferences 
through mimicry. In the literature, this idea appears in many guises, the phrase most 
commonly used being ‘role model’. Coleman’s example of PTA-run schools is a good 
illustration. According to Coleman, children whose parents are involved in running the 
school adopt a more positive attitude towards study. This change in preferences cannot be 
understood as altruism: it is in the children’s long-term self-interest to study. Nor does it 
appear to be purely the result of a sharpened sense of guilt for not studying. Rather it is 
related to a demonstration or role model effect: children change their preferences to 
mimic that of their parents. By visibly and credibly demonstrating their positive attitude 
towards school, parents induce a change in attitude among their children.  
This kind of phenomenon is related to what economists have called ‘herding 
behavior’, that is, the drive to mimic the behavior of others. More research is needed in 
this area to fully comprehend the phenomenon and its implications for economic 
efficiency. As has been argued formally in Blume (2002), however, mimicry need not 
result in superior equilibria: nothing in mimicry itself precludes agents from copying bad 
behaviors instead of good ones. One famous example is that of a group of high school 
students who refused to take their graduation exam as a symbol of group identity, even 
though doing so hurt them all. Other examples of bad mimicry involve hazing, gang rape, 
crime culture, and the like. Unlike altruism, mimicry is a double-edged sword. 
 
Coordination and leadership 
 
  Some of the beneficial effects of social capital on preferences occur by osmosis, 
without any purposeful action by anyone: people chat around a glass of beer and, quite by 
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benefits of social capital are only achieved through purposeful action: someone has to 
want to improve the group’s welfare and must do something about it for benefits to 
materialize. This is particularly true of any benefit that requires coordination in order to 
be achieved. 
  This raises a host of difficult issues having to do with the decision making process 
within groups. It is well beyond the scope of this Chapter to discuss these issues in detail. 
A few remarks are nevertheless in order. First, two essential ingredients seem to play 
fundamental roles in purposeful group action: leadership, and rules regarding group 
decision making. At this level of generality, their respective role is unclear. What is 
inescapable, however, is that neither of them constitutes social capital.  
  In very informal groupings, leadership is likely to be essential to alter individual 
preferences and elicit voluntary contributions to the common good. While social capital 
may assist the action of leaders by facilitating the circulation of information and favoring 
group identification, the respective roles of leadership quality and social capital are likely 
to be extremely difficult to disentangle. This has important implications for empirical 
work: if good leadership is required to achieve the coordination required to benefit from 
social capital, testing the effect of social capital requires controlling for the quality of 
leadership.  
This observation also has implications for policy. Good leaders may improve 
efficiency by using the levers of social capital – e.g., by fostering altruistic preferences 
and concern for the common good; favoring group identification; preaching good 
behavior and making free-riders feel guilty; encouraging mimicry of good behavior 
through role models and the manipulation of group symbols and representations (e.g., 
religion, ideology). This is what practitioners in the field call ‘building social capital’.
12 
Many NGOs, for instance, are engaged in precisely this kind of work. Sometimes they 
focus on the identification and training of local leaders, something to which many NGOs 
refer as an example of ‘capacity building’ (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2004)). 
                                                           
12To a number of economists, these forms of policy intervention may seem unusual 
because they have no effect on material incentives but operate only through mental 
representations. We revisit these issues in greater detail below. 
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decisions are made and deviance penalized. A simple majority rule combined with fines 
and jail sentences for free-riders is in many cases sufficient to reach efficiency. As long 
as free-riding is not so prevalent as to overwhelm policing, punishments directly alter 
incentives in ways that align individual behavior with the common good. In this case, 
social capital plays little role – except perhaps in coordinating not to overwhelm the 
enforcement apparatus. Leadership also becomes less critical since there is no need for a 
charismatic leader who can affect individual preferences directly. All that is required is a 
‘bureaucratic’ leader who can apply and enforce the rules decided by the group. 
A proper investigation of the importance of social capital in economic life 
therefore requires a careful analysis of the rules by which decisions are reached. It is 
important not to credit social capital with outcomes due to formal rules. This means 
distinguishing between the benefits resulting directly from formal organization and the 
indirect benefits members derive from contact with each other. For instance, the Rotary 
Club has a decision making body to coordinate the date and venue of its next dinner. The 
coordination benefit of meeting on the same day in the same place follows directly from 
the Club’s formal rules. But once at the dinner, there is probably no coordinated 
mechanism to share information among members.  
This same sort of reasoning applies to schools. In addition to the effects of student 
attitudes discussed by Coleman, PTA-run schools have an organizational structure 
different from that of other schools. In particular, decisions are taken differently and 
funding is allocated in a different manner when parents and teachers possess 
decisionmaking power in schools.  As Jimenez and Sawada (1999) have shown in the 
case of El Salvador, PTA-run schools tend to provide greater remuneration and select 
better teachers than other schools.  These schools also exhibit lower rates of teacher 
absenteeism.  At least part of these differences may plausibly be attributed to differences 
in funding and internal decision-making rules. Disentangling these effects from those of 
social capital is likely to be difficult and contentious. 
 
III.iii. Formal theory 
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modern microeconomic theory, there has been relatively little formal modeling of social 
capital per se.   One reason for this, we conjecture, is the absence of a generally accepted 
and coherent definition of social capital, as discussed.   
In terms of the efforts to embody social capital in formal economic models, one 
approach that has been taken is to incorporate social capital in models in the context of 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games.   In environments in which agents change partners, 
the sustainability of a cooperative equilibrium depends on either the likelihood with 
which a match today will be repeated in the future and/or the ability of an agent to access 
information about the past behavior of a new partner (Kandori (1992)).  In this context, 
social capital is interpreted in terms of the factors that facilitate the existence of a 
cooperative equilibrium.  Routledge and von Amsberg (2003), using a prisoner’s 
dilemma environment of the type we described above, define social capital as present 
whenever a cooperative equilibrium exists; the key variable that determines whether 
cooperation can occur is the probability of trade between a pair of agents.  Intuitively, if 
this probability is high, two agents meeting today are likely to meet in the future, so that 
any loss from cooperation today is compensated by future cooperation in the repeated 
relationship.  Routledge and von Amsberg apply this idea to study how migration across 
regions or sectors, can, by lowering the likelihood of repeated interactions, lead to a loss 
of social capital.  Annen (2003) defines social capital as an individual’s reputation for 
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games.  In his analysis, this reputation depends on the 
extent to which information transmission about past behavior is reliable and the 
complexity of the network in which agents interact.  Changes in either reliability or 
complexity can thus alter levels of social capital. Annen focuses on the question of when 
increases in network complexity lead to a reduction of network size or an increase in 
network size accompanied by greater investment in communication capacity. 
Other formal theory relevant to social capital includes efforts to model the notions 
of trust and trustworthiness.  Zak and Knack (2001) study a general equilibrium growth 
model in which agents facing moral hazard problems decide how much to invest in 
monitoring.  The presence and strength of formal and informal sanctions for dishonesty 
are shown to have powerful implications for growth because of their role in reducing the 
  25need to invest in monitoring.  Another approach to modeling trust is due to Somanathan 
and Rubin (2004), who study the evolutionary stability of honest types in a population.  
  Perhaps the most important contribution to formal theory is Dasgupta (2002) 
which provides a wide ranging discussion of the relationship between social capital and 
formal modeling.  Dasgupta argues that social capital should not be defined in terms of 
the presence of cooperation or some other outcome; rather that it should be regarded 
directly as social structure.   
“…social capital is most usefully viewed as a system of 
interpersonal networks…If the externalities network formation 
gives to are “confined”, social capital is an aspect of “human 
capital”, in the sense economists use the latter term.  However, if 
network externalities are more in the nature of public goods, social 
capital is a component of what economists call “total factor 
productivity.” (pg. 6-7) 
 
  
Dasgupta’s analysis is important as it indicates how the role of social capital in growth 
cannot be reduced to the addition of a variable to a linear cross-country growth 
regression.  His analysis is also important in its recognition that theoretical claims about 
the desirability of the sorts of social structures that have been equated to social capital are 
to some extent artifices of particular modeling assumptions.  For example, he argues that 
the claim that repetition of a one-shot game necessarily benefits the players of the game 
is not a generic finding and in fact does not generally hold for payoff structures other than 
the prisoner’s dilemma, going on to argue that work such as Fudenburg and Maskin 
(1996) shows how social capital can lead to exploitive relationships.  As such Dasgupta’s 
analysis makes clear how functional notions of social capital are inconsistent with 
rigorous theorizing.  Other conceptual discussions of social capital and social science 
include Ostrom and Ahn (2002) and Paldam and Svendsen (2000); the former is 
particularly interesting to contrast with Dasgupta (2002) as it is written from the 
perspective of non-economists and indicates some of the conceptual gaps between 
economists and other social scientists on this topic. 
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IV.   From theory to empirics: econometrics and social capital 
 
Having clarified the relationship between social capital and the efficiency of 
social exchange, we now turn to the statistical analysis of the effects of social capital. We 
first revisit the points raised in this section, such as the distinction between individual and 
aggregate efficiency effects. We then ask whether it is possible to uncover social capital 
effects from the sorts of data available to social scientists. In particular, we discuss the 
issue of identification, that is, of whether a role for social capital can be uncovered when 
other types of social effects may be present. 
Standard practice in economics and sociology is to run regressions of some 
outcome of interest against a set of controls and some asserted empirical proxies for 
social capital.  These regressions are often justified by an informal argument that the 
empirical proxies act as instrumental variables for the unobserved “true” social capital 
measure.  At one extreme, one finds analyses such as Furstenburg and Hughes (1995) in 
which the probability that an individual drops out of school is related to variables such as 
the presence of a father in the household or the educational aspirations of the person’s 
friends.  In contrast, studies such as Knack and Keefer (1997) attempt to explain growth 
differences across entire countries using survey measures of trust.   
In this section, we discuss some general econometric issues that arise in social 
capital studies of this type.  We first examine difficulties inherent in the estimation of the 
benefits from social capital on the basis of individual data. These difficulties are not 
specific to social capital and are shared by other externalities. But they are often ignored 
in empirical work. 
Second, we discuss the question of model specification. In particular, we review 
some requirements for treating a given social capital regression as causal. Next, we 
discuss identification. In this case, we assume that a researcher has the “correct” model of 
some outcome of interest and ask whether observational data on the phenomena will 
allow for the identification of a causal relationship between social capital and the 
outcome.  
  27The basic econometric issues associated with identifying a role for social capital 
may be understood in the context of cross-sections.  While panel data have certain 
advantages, notably that they allow for the researcher to control for fixed effects across 
units, the conditions under which social capital effects may be identified are not 
qualitatively different. 
 
IV.i. Externalities and individual vs. aggregate effects 
 
As we have discussed in Section II, the literature on social capital is interested in 
externalities arising from coordination failure. Much of the empirical work on social 
capital seeks to identify the effect of social capital on an outcome variable of interest, 
say,  i ω . This variable of interest can be measured at the aggregate level – e.g., country 
growth – or at the individual level – e.g., performance of a pupil on an exam. Empirical 
work on social capital can thus be divided into individual and aggregate level regressions.  
The first difficulty many researchers encounter is that individual returns to social 
capital often are poor predictors of aggregate externalities. There are two main reasons 
for this: fallacy of composition and free riding. A fallacy of composition arises whenever 
social capital pegs individuals against each other. In a situation of competition for a finite 
resource, the gains made by those with more social capital lead to losses for those 
without, relative to a situation without social capital. Free riding is the opposite situation 
in which aggregate social gains are larger than those appropriated by the owners of social 
capital. We discuss them in turn. 
 
Fallacy of composition 
 
To illustrate fallacy of composition, consider a simple job search example 
inspired by Granovetter’s work. Suppose there are M job openings and N job seekers, all 
identical, with N>M. Suppose that employers and workers do not know each other and 
are matched at random. Since N>M, all positions are filled and each worker has an equal 
probability of getting a job 
M
N
.  Total surplus is the sum of employer and worker 
  28surplus. Since all workers are equivalent, total surplus is the same irrespective of which 
workers get the available jobs. 
Next suppose that, because of interpersonal connections, a group of workers C 
hears about the open positions before other workers. Further suppose that CM < . 
Consequently C workers get a job with probability 1. Other workers get the remaining 





 which is smaller than 
M
N
. Total surplus is unchanged since 
workers are equivalent. Social networks – in this case the existence of a better connected 
group of workers – have no effect on the efficiency of social exchange. But they have 
important distributional consequences, which can be measured by regressing the 
probability of obtaining a job on group membership. Doing so in our example would 






 on membership in the group even though the net effect 
of social networks on aggregate welfare is zero. What this example illustrates is that 
social networks can have private returns even when they have no effect – other than 
distributional – on the efficiency of social exchange. Observing private returns to social 
networks should therefore not be construed as evidence of social capital. In our example, 
social networks actually generate a discriminatory outcome, which is inconsistent with 
equality of opportunity as conceptualized by Roemer (1998) for example.
13
The above reasoning can be extended to situations where groups, not individuals, 
compete with each other. Consider, for instance, high schools competing to place their 
graduates at Harvard. We assume that the number of admissions in Harvard is fixed and 
that the university selects the students with the best grades on a standardized test. 
Suppose that Coleman is right and that, because of the social capital effects of parental 
involvement in school affairs, students in PTA-run schools obtain better grades. As a 
result, they are more likely to go to Harvard than students from non-PTA schools. 
Whether or not this raises social welfare depends on how critical high school education is 
to university learning.  
                                                           
13 A similar example could be constructed in which it is the effect of social capital on 
trust that matters. For instance, imagine silk produced in China and consumed in Europe. 
Chinese silk producers do not trust European consumers so that direct sale is not possible. 
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Harvard. The only purpose of high school education is to screen out less able students. 
Further assume that the minimum grade required to be admitted at Harvard is higher than 
the grade necessary to earn one’s degree: some applicants do not get in even though, if 
they did, they would earn their degree. In this case, the role of social capital is again to 
enable one group – students in PTA schools – preferential access to a rationed resource – 
admission at Harvard. The effect of social capital is distributional. Regressing the 
probability of admission in Harvard on social capital would yield a positive coefficient 
even though, in this example, the effect of social capital on the efficiency of social 
exchange is zero. Of course, we do not claim that the above example is an accurate 
depiction of the education system. The only purpose of the example is to illustrate the 
danger of estimating the beneficial effect of social capital by comparing individual or 
group outcomes according to whether or not they have social capital. Whenever social 
capital enables one group to displace another, a statistical comparison of the two groups 
is bound to overestimate the efficiency gain from social capital. 
This example exposes another ambiguity of the concept of social capital. In our 
review of definitions of social capital, we noted that most authors associate social capital 
with the idea of beneficial group externalities. In the above – admittedly extreme – 
example, groups of students in PTA-run schools benefit from the social capital generated 
by their parents. But society as a whole does not. According to our definition, there is 
social capital at the level of each group but not at the aggregate level. This contradiction 
serves to remind us that it is perilous to define a social process as necessarily having 




It is also possible that social capital generates beneficial externalities but yields no 
(or few) individual returns for the holders of social capital. A case in point is when the 
external effects of social capital are fully captured by outsiders – i.e. individuals or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
A group of traders who manages to gain the trust of both producers and consumers can 
then capture the silk trade. 
  30groups who are outside the social networks or do not share the norms and values of the 
group – who do not incur the cost of generating the externality. 
To see this, consider N groups of fishermen tapping the same fishing ground.
14 
Without collective action, there is over-fishing. Suppose that fishing groups with better 
social capital enforce self-restraint – either through shared norms or through relational 
contracting – while others do not.  Gains from self-restraint are shared among all 
fishermen, irrespective of whether they have social capital or not. Social capital increases 
aggregate social welfare but fishermen with less social capital have higher profit because 
they free ride: they benefit from the self-restraint of others without having to incur any 
cost. Regressing fish catch on social capital would result in a zero or negative coefficient 
on social capital even though it has a positive social return.    
The externality can also be pecuniary. Keeping the fishing example, a similar 
result obtains if the fishing groups do not share a common fishing ground but sell their 
fish on the same market: social capital makes collusion to restrict supply possible since 
all fishermen benefit from higher fish prices.
15  To ascertain the effect of social capital, 
one needs to compare fishing groups who do not compete with each other by either 
accessing the same fishing ground or by selling fish on the same market.  
What these examples demonstrate is that, in the presence of fallacy of 
composition or free riding, individual returns from social capital are poor indicators of 
aggregate returns. If social capital enables certain individuals or groups to capture rents at 
the expense of others (e.g., jobs in a non-clearing labor market, entry at Harvard when the 
entry criterion is excessive), individual returns to social capital exceed social returns, and 
social capital generates unequal outcomes. In contrast, if social capital generates positive 
externalities not fully appropriated by owners of social capital, individual returns 
underestimate social returns. 
 
IV.ii. Model  specification 
                                                           
14  This example is  inspired by the work of Platteau and Seki (2002) on Japanese 
fishermen. 
15 An example of this situation is OPEC: not all oil producing countries are member, but 
they all benefit from higher prices even though only members of the cartel restrict their 
production. 
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As we have noted, social capital studies have been applied to a remarkably large 
number of units of observation, ranging from individual farmers to countries. One natural 
question is whether these studies in fact use comparable observations. At an abstract 
level, comparability of observations is a requirement for virtually all causal studies.  We 
raise the question in the context of social capital studies for several reasons.   
First, social capital studies, particularly those that employ aggregate data, often 
use relatively crude sets of control variables.  As a result, the residuals in the sample will 
contain forms of heterogeneity that call into question the placement of the observations in 
a common regression.  
Second, social capital studies often fail to account for the reasons why different 
agents come to have different levels of social capital.  As Durlauf (2002c) states 
…statistical analyses of social capital typically compare outcomes 
for individuals or aggregates who have social capital versus those 
who do not.  These studies, in turn, typically do not incorporate a 
separate theory of the determinants of social capital formation, 
although they do often employ instrumental variables to account 
for the endogeneity of social capital.  However, without a theory as 
to why one observes differences in social capital formation, one 
cannot have much confidence that unobserved heterogeneity is 
absent in the samples under study. (pg. 464) 
 
Notice that this argument is more general than simply arguing that social capital is an 
endogenous variable. Since the groups in which individuals are organized often are 
endogenous, there will be various forms of sample selection that need to be accounted for 
in empirical work. 
To see that these are more than abstract concerns, consider the regressions 
employed in Helliwell and Putnam (2000) to show the effects of social capital on 
economic growth.  These authors regress regional output growth in Italy against initial 
output and measures of civic community, institutional performance, and citizen 
satisfaction.  They find that these three measures explain persistent differences in 
regional growth rates and conclude that this supports social capital explanations of 
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conclusion is the assumption that the regression they employ is using comparable objects 
as observations.  In other words, the analysis assumes that each observation is generated 
by a common growth process. What must be assumed about the growth process in 
different regions when one includes Northern and Southern Italian regions in a 
regression? One answer to this question is that one must assume that given the variables 
included in the regression, the errors for the observations of different regions cannot be 
distinguished, at least from the perspective of their distributions. Put differently, one must 
assume that the regression is such that there is no reason to expect that the error from a 
particular region has a nonzero expected value, for example.  But how can a regression of 
this crudity make such a breathtaking claim?  The historical and social science literatures 
give any number of reasons why this assumption is false in contexts such as Italian 
regimes.  But if the assumption is false then one cannot defend the interpretation 
provided by Helliwell and Putnam (2000) for their regression results.  
Brock and Durlauf (2001b) argue that a way to formalize the notion of 
comparability is via the mathematical concept of exchangeability.  We introduce this 
formalism as it provides a way of providing a link between the ways one thinks about 
data as a social scientist and the sorts of statistical assumptions that underlie regression 
exercises. 
Suppose that for each of I  observations, one has associated information  . This 
information may include factors that are quantifiable, such as the savings rate of a 
country, as well as factors that are not necessarily quantifiable, such as knowledge of a 
country’s culture.  Suppose that some outcome 
i F
i ω  is generated by the linear model 
 
ii Z i ω γη = +  (1) 
 
where  i Z  represents that part of   that is controlled for in the regression.  Typically, 
models such as (1) are interpreted as meaning that, except for differences in the value of 
i F
i Z ,  i ω  may be thought of as draws from a common distribution, which in turn means 
that the  i η ’s are drawn from a common distribution.  Notice, however, that this notion of 
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information set available for each observation, i.e.  .  Hence, interpretation of (1) 
presupposes that having controlled for the various 
i F
i Z ’s, one has no information that 
allows one to distinguish the residuals.  Formally, the errors   i η  are   -conditionally 
exchangeable, which means that 
i F
 
  () () ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 ,, ,, K KI K K aa F F a a F ρρ µη η µη η == = = = …… … I F …       (2) 
 
where  ( ) ρ ⋅  is an operator that permutes the K  indices.   
Exchangeability is a useful formalization because it creates a benchmark for the 
assessment of empirical studies.  In fact, many of the standard problems that arise in 
regression analysis amount to exchangeability violations.  For example, when a regressor 
is omitted from a regression, this will mean that the errors in (1) are no longer 
exchangeable as the distribution of a given error will depend on the distribution of the 
included and omitted variables. Similarly, if there is parameter heterogeneity between 
observations, this will imply that the distribution of a given error depends on which 
country it is associated with.  To take a third example, self-selection can induce 
exchangeability violations as the errors associated with one observation may be 
differentiated from other differences in the implications of self-selection for the 
conditional expectations of the residuals.  To be clear, as Brock and Durlauf (2001b) 
observe, exchangeability is not necessary for causally interpreting regressions. For 
example, heteroskedasticity in errors is an exchangeability violation, but is compatible 
with a structural regression interpretation.  What we argue here is that good empirical 
practice requires that one assess whether conditional exchangeability of errors holds for 
the regression under study.  To be more precise, we believe that a good empirical practice 
is to ask, for a given regression specification whether, given the information a researcher 
possesses about the individual observations, the researcher can justify the assumption of 
(2) and if not, determine whether the regression retains the interpretation the researcher 
wishes to place upon it. 
 
  34Instrumental variables 
 
As observed above, in many contexts social capital is endogenous social capital. 
The problem of endogeneity is obvious in many contexts; when one talks about 
membership in organizations, one must account for the fact that membership is a choice 
variable.  In other cases, the endogeneity problem is more subtle.  Measures of trust are 
often used to characterize social capital. Since trust presumably is related to 
trustworthiness in actual behavior, such measures will exhibit endogeneity problems as 
well.  
Many researchers have recognized that social capital is endogenous and so have 
employed instrumental variables to allow for consistent estimation of parameters. 
Leaving aside issues of self-selection that are not often not appropriately addressed by 
instrumental variables approaches, the use of instrumental variables in social capital 
studies can be subjected to criticism.  Specifically, in many social capital studies the 
choice of instrumental variables often appears to rely on ad hoc and untenable exogeneity 
assumptions.  
For example, Narayan and Pritchett (1999), using village level data, argue that 
measures of village level trust can instrument for measures of group memberships.  In 
their analysis social capital effects are argued to occur when one individual’s 
“associational life” affects others in his village; measures of associational life include 
factors such as the number of group memberships.  Since associational life may be a 
consumption good and thereby an increasing function of individual income, Narayan and 
Pritchett argue that it must be instrumented if one wants to identify how social capital 
causally affects income.  Yet, there is little reason that such a variable is a valid 
instrument.  As pointed out above, if trust is related to trustworthiness, as presumably is 
the case, then there is no reason why trustworthy behavior is any different than 
membership in an organization in terms of whether it is a choice variable. And without a 
theory of what determines trustworthy behavior, there is little hope of identifying credible 
instrumental variables for it in these types of regressions. 
The choice of instrumental variables is often one of the most difficult problems in 
empirical work.  In social capital contexts, the absence of explicit modeling of the 
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researcher is forced to rely on intuition and guesswork.  While this does not condemn all 
studies using instrumental variables, we do believe that inadequate attention has been 
paid to justifying instrumental variables in social capital contexts.  
 
Group effects versus social capital effects 
 
A final specification issue in social capital studies concerns the question of 
distinguishing between social capital and other group effects. There is no shortage of 
reasons why group memberships influence individuals. For example, in recent models of 
income inequality, primary emphasis has been given to peer group effects and role model 
effects as influencing educational outcomes for youths.  This creates a relationship 
between the outcomes for a given youth and the outcomes of others in his community of 
residence.
16  In many modern growth models, a key assumption is the presence of various 
types of increasing returns to scale that are produced by externalities. These types of 
models often take the form of positing that the productivity of a given actor depends on 
the human and physical capital stocks of others. From the perspective of statistical 
modeling, the description of individual behavior will require the incorporation of various 
group-level variables. 
From the perspective of empirical work, the problem is simple.  If one claims that 
a social capital effect is present for some behavior on the basis of the statistical 
significance of a group-level variable, this claim will not be credible unless one is able to 
argue that the group-level variable is capturing social capital versus some alternative 
group-level effect.  This problem is particularly serious when social capital is 
endogenous, since aggregate levels of social capital are then determined by other group-
level variables, which, in absence of strong prior information, presumably include 
whatever aggregate variables have been omitted from a regression explaining outcomes. 
 
                                                           
16See Durlauf (2001,2002a) for discussion of a range of possible group-level influences 
on individual behavior. 
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The question of social capital and other group effects leads to the question of 
identification.  In this section, we assume that the model under study is correctly 
specified and evaluate what model parameters can be recovered from observational data.  
This work is developed in Durlauf (2002c), a paper which builds on early work by 
Manski (1993) and later work by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,c) on identifying group 
effects in data.  Our basic framework treats the level of social capital in a community as 
an endogenous variable that represents the aggregation of individual-specific social 
capital levels (for example, investments in individual-specific social capital as in Glaeser, 
Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002)).  As such, the determination of how social capital effects 
individuals is an example of the “reflection problem” that Manski’s seminal (1993) paper 
characterizes; identification problems arise when one needs to distinguish the effects of 
the choices of others versus the characteristics of others on an individual.  Identification 
questions when social capital is exogenous are discussed separately. 
 
IV.iii.a.  Individual-level Data 
 
We first consider the case where one wishes to understand the effect of social 
capital on some individual outcome  i ω .  For individual-level data, linear versions of 
social capital models can be expressed as follows.  Suppose that each agent i  is a 
member of some group  .  Each individual chooses an outcome variable  () gi i ω  that is 
linearly dependent on some control variables.  Assume these variables are of four types: 
an  -dimension vector of variables that are measured at the individual level, r i X ; an  -
dimension vector of variables (often called contextual effects) that are measured at the 
group level and are predetermined at the time that choices are made, 
s
() g i Y ; an individual's 
expectation of the average choice of others,  () () ( ) E g ig i F ω  (called an endogenous effect, 
cf. Manski (1993)), where this expectation is made conditional on some information set 
() g i F ; and expected social capital in the community,  () () ( ) E g ig i SC F . The assumption that 
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in any loss of generality. Similarly, our assumption that agents react to the expected 
behaviors and social capital levels in their group rather than the expected levels among 
group members other than themselves has no bearing on the analysis, cf. Brock and 
Durlauf  (2001a,c).  
We assume that the  i X  and  () g i Y  vectors are components of the information sets 
from which expectations are formed; these expectations are further assumed to be 
rational, so we work with mathematical expectations rather than subjective beliefs.  The 
behavioral outcome is described by 
 
  () () () ( ) () () ( ) 12 EE ii i gi gi gi gi gi kc X d Y J F J S C F ω ωε =+ + + + + (3) 
  
In order to close the model, it is necessary to specify how group level social 
capital is determined.  We assume that group level social capital is the average of 
individual social capital levels,  .  These levels are determined by an individual-level 
behavioral equation that is analogous to (3): 
i SC
 
  () () () ( ) () () ( ) 12 EE ii i gi gi gi gi gi SC k cX dY J F J SC F ω η =+ + + + + (4) 
 
The identification problem amounts to asking whether the parameters in (3) are 
uniquely determined by the reduced form equations that describe  i ω  and  .  In order 
to solve for these reduced form equations, one first applies an expectations operator to 
both sides of (3) and (4).  For the outcome equation,  
i SC
 




  38  () () ()





gi g ig i
gi gi












and for the social capital equation 
  
() () () () () () ( ) () () ( ) () 1 2 EE gi E g ig i g i g ig i g ig i SC F k cX dY J F J SC F ω =+ + + +  
 
or  
  () () ()





gi g ig i
gi gi









In these expressions,  () g i X
 
is the within-group average of  i X  and represents the relevant 
set of variables that relate individual characteristics of group members to the group-level 
behaviors.  Subsituting out  () () () E g ig i F ω  and  () () ( ) E g ig i SC F in (3) and (4) using the 
expressions in (5) and (6) produces reduced form expressions for  i ω  and  .  Durlauf 





Proposition 1. Identification in linear individual-level models with social capital 
  
Identification of the parameters in eq. (3) requires 
i.  The dimension of the linear space spanned by elements of  () ( ) 1,  , i g i XY  is 
.  1 rs ++
ii.  The dimension of the linear space spanned by the elements o ) f (   () ( ) 1,  , , i g ig XX Y
t  .  
i  
is at leas 3 rs ++
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What this proposition states is that identification depends critically on the 
relationship between the vector  () g i X  that does not appear in the behavioral equations (3) 
and (4) and the vectors  i X  and  () g i Y
 
that do appear in these equations.  Intuitively, the 
key idea is that identification of equation (3) fails if  () () ( ) E g ig i F ω   and  () () () E g ig i SC F  
are linearly dependent on the other terms in the regression, i.e.  () ( ) 1,  , i g i XY .  Each of 
these variables is a linear function of  () g i Y  and  () g i X .  So, if  () g i X  is linearly independent 
of these other regressors, identification may hold. 
What does this theorem require in terms of empirical implementation?  A key 
requirement is that there are at least two  i X  variables whose within-group averages are 
not elements of  () g i Y .  The existence of such variables will of course depend on context.  
For example, one can imagine situations in which an individual’s age affects his 
behavior, but not the average age of others in his group.  The need for such prior 
information illustrates how field work and qualitative studies can augment formal 
statistical analyses. 
 
IV.iii.b.  Aggregate data 
 
A number of social capital studies employ data that are aggregated. Typically, 
these studies explore the average behavior of groupings which define the social 
environment for the individuals that comprise them.  From the perspective of estimation, 
one can think of such models as taking within group averages of (3) and (4), so that  
 




  ( ) ( ) 12 EE g gg g g g SC k dY J F J SC F g ω η =+ + + +  (8) 
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where  g ω and  g SC  are group level averages. 
Necessary conditions for identification in this case are also developed in Durlauf 
(2002c). To characterize these conditions, let  ,g Hω  and   denote the linear spaces 
spanned by those regressors 
, SC g H
g Y   with nonzero coefficients in equations (7) and (8) 
respectively.  Let   denote that part of   that is orthogonal to  ,
c
SC g H , SC g H ,g Hω  (i.e. the 
linear space formed by the orthogonal complements of any basis of   after being 
projected on 
, SC g H
,g Hω ).  These spaces are used in the following proposition on identification. 
 
Proposition 2. Identification of social capital effects with aggregate data 
 
i.  Identification of the parameters in eq. (7) requires that the dimension of the linear 
space  is at least 2.  ,
c
SC g H
ii.  If   is known to equal 0, then identification of the parameters of eq. (7) requires 






Relative to the identification condition for the individual level model, there are 
some important differences. Specifically, in the aggregate case, one no longer has access 
to instrumental variables based on the averaging of individual-level variables. In order to 
achieve identification, it is necessary to have prior knowledge of aggregate variables that 
affect social capital but do not affect the aggregate outcome under study.  Intuitively, in 
the aggregate data case, one is in essence working with a standard simultaneous equations 
system, so cross-equation exclusion restrictions must be employed to achieve 
identification.     
To repeat, the import of these various econometrics issues depends on the context 
under study, the data available to a researcher, etc.  The issues raised in this section 
should be regarded as providing benchmarks in the assessment of empirical studies; their 
salience will depend on the context that is under study. 
 
  41IV.iii.c. Identification with predetermined social capital 
  
  When social capital is predetermined, the relevant individual level equation is 
now 
 
  () () () ( ) () 12 E ii gi gi gi gi kc X d Y J F J S C i ω ω =+ + + + + ε  (9) 
 
which means that social capital enters the equation in a symmetric way to the contextual 
effects  () g i Y .  Identification for models of this type has been initially studied in Manski 
(1993) and subsequently by Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b); an identification problem still 
exists because of the potential multicollinearity of  () () ( ) E g ig i F ω  with the other control 
variables in (9). Durlauf (2002c) provides the following necessary conditions for 
identification. 
 
Proposition 3. Identification of individual level behavioral equation with exogenous 
social capital 
 
Identification of the parameters in eq. (9) requires 
 
i.   The dimension of the linear space spanned by elements of ( ) () () 1, , , ig i g i XY S C is 
.  2 rs ++
 
ii.    The dimension of the linear space spanned by the elements of 
 is at least   () () () () 1, , , , ig i g i g i XX Y S C 3 rs + + . 
 
  However, unlike the endogenous social capital case, it may be possible to identify 
whether the role of social capital is nonzero even if (9) is not identified.  Following an 
argument of Manski (1993), observe that the reduced form for (9) is  
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cX X Y SC
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−− − −
 (10) 





 is sufficient for determining whether 
there is some social capital effect.  Identification of this parameter requires that the social 
capital variable is not linearly dependent on the other variables in (10); formally (Durlauf 
(2002c)) verifies 
 
Proposition 4. Identification of a social capital effect when social capital is 
exogenous 
 
If the dimension of ()  exceeds  () () () 1, , , , ig i g i g i XX Y S C ( ) () () 1, , , ig i g i XX Y  then the presence 
of a social capital effect may be identified from (10). 
 
  Proposition 4 may be readily extended to the case of aggregate data; if aggregate 
social capital is exogenous then it is simply nothing more than an additional regressor in 
an aggregate outcome regression.  On the other hand, if one is working with aggregate 
data and social capital is exogenous, then it is impossible to identify any of the model 
parameters. The reason is simple: there are no longer any instrumental variables available 
from the social capital equation to instrument  () () ( ) E g ig i F ω , so no analog to Proposition 
3 exists. 
 
IV.iv. Additional  issues 
 
A number of difficulties beyond identification plague empirical work on social 
capital. As we have emphasized in Section II, reliance on interpersonal relationships and 
networks can often be seen as a symptom that formal institutions do not work well.
17 To 
                                                           
17 This does not imply that networks would never be observed in well developed markets. 
Through interpersonal relationships, economic agents may form coalitions to subvert the 
market equilibrium to their advantage. Think of cartels, for instance. Clubs and networks 
can similarly be used to bias market outcomes, e.g., to ban non-whites or women from 
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markets in different countries and we seek to estimate whether the density of social 
networks raises the average quality of the match between workers and employers. 
Suppose for the sake of argument that we have a convincing measure for the average 
quality of the match. Regressing this measure against the density of social networks is 
likely to yield incorrect results if the researcher does not control for differences in formal 
institutions across the countries.  
For instance, employment offices may play an active match-making role in some 
countries. Failing to control for employment offices would underestimate the effect of 
social capital. In fact, if employment offices channel information more efficiently than 
interpersonal networks and if these networks arise in response to the absence of 
employment offices, countries with more networks will have less efficient labor markets.  
Studies of the effects of social capital on the delivery of public goods suffer from 
other problems as well. Earlier in this section we have argued that social capital is 
difficult to disentangle from other group effects. One such group effect likely to influence 
empirical work is the role of leadership. Community leaders often play a crucial role in 
fostering the creation of social capital – e.g., membership drive – that they can harness 
for a particular goal. Observing a relationship between social capital and the presence of 
a public good may be due to the presence of a third, unobserved factor: leadership. The 
distinction between the two effects is important for policy because good community 
leaders are rare and leadership is much harder to replicate than groups. 
 
 
V.   Empirical studies of the effects of social capital 
 
Following the econometric discussion, the literature on the effects of social capital 
may be divided into two types: individual and aggregate studies. 
 
V.i. Individual-level studies 
                                                                                                                                                                             
certain jobs. Political clientelism is another example (Bayart (1989)). In all these cases, 
social capital actually reduces aggregate welfare. 
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Individual-level studies of social capital may be divided into studies that focus on 
developing societies and studies that focus on OECD societies.  This division reflects 
more than data sets.  Studies of social capital in developing societies are associated with 
somewhat different questions than their OECD (primarily United States-based) 
counterparts.  This division reflects differences in underlying concerns.  Development 
scholars are interested in social capital as a mechanism to ameliorate society-wide 
problems whereas interest in advanced societies tends to derive from concerns about the 
persistence of social exclusion and poverty in affluent societies. 
A typical social capital study in this literature posits an individual outcome of the 
form  
 
  () () ii gi gi XYJ S C i ω γπ ε = ++ +  (11) 
 
where, following previous notation,  i X  denotes a set of individual controls,  () g i Y  denotes 
a set of group controls and  () g i SC  denotes social capital. As such, eq. (11) corresponds to 
the case of exogenous social capital discussed in Section III.  Evidence for the relevance 
of social capital is equated with the statistical significance of the coefficient J.  In the 
various tables we have constructed to summarize various empirical papers, we report 
dependent variables and social capital measures, as well as findings based on the 
statistical significance standard.  
 
Social capital and development 
 
Links between social capital and development have been examined in a range of 
contexts.  One reason for this is that the failure of many developing economies to achieve 
sustained growth has led social scientists to look for previously unexplored factors in the 
development process. Table 1 lists a number of studies of social capital in developing 
societies.   
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Similarly, a range of social capital measures have been employed.  While these studies 
are quite disparate, there are some commonalities.  First, these development studies 
typically focus on measures describing the social networks in which individuals 
participate.  Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Fafchamps and Minten (2001,2002), Grootaert 
(2000), Isham (2002) and Narayan and Pritchett (1999) all give primary focus to the role 
of memberships in various organization and trading networks as determinants of 
economic outcomes.  The quite different social capital measures used by Lee and Brinton 
(1996) and Palloni et al (2001) reflect the different outcomes they are measuring 
(immigration and placement in elite firms.)  Further, the studies in Table 1 give primary 
focus to participation in organizations that can provide economic benefits in terms of 
information sharing and the production of collective goods.  In this sense, these studies 
focus on economic benefits to organizations as opposed to more tangible psychological 
and social benefits. 
From the perspective of the discussion of identification in Section III, several 
questions arise.  First, how does one differentiate social capital effects from the presence 
of other group effects such as information spillovers, or the presence of common factors 
such as legal or political institutions?  In the papers discussed here, relatively little 
attention has been paid to this question.  Notice that the failure to consider this issue is 
not necessarily a damning criticism, in the sense that one may have reasons to rule out 
such effects in advance.  However, these studies also typically fail to make good 
arguments that alternative social determinants of outcomes can be ignored.  This strikes 
us as a more serious indictment in that social capital variables can easily proxy for such 
factors.   Put differently, we have argued that social capital represents a new explanation 
of individual and aggregate outcomes primarily to the extent that it embodies certain 
types of informal norms.  The empirical literature typically does not contrast this view 
with alternative perspectives on social interactions.  
In our judgment, the more successful studies of social capital and development 
are those that have focused on specific phenomena that have been placed under the social 
capital rubric.  Unsurprisingly, Fafchamps and Minten (2002) is in our view a good 
example of this approach.  As indicated in the paper’s title, the focus of the analysis is 
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profitability.  This paper focuses on agricultural traders in Madagascar. These traders are 
intermediaries between farmers and various markets in the country.  Because the goods 
they sell (staples such as rice, potatoes, and beans) are well defined (the basic goods are 
homogeneous and are distinguishable by observable features such as whether they have 
been milled or converted to flour, etc.), it is relatively easy to measure the value added 
associated with a trader’s activity.  Fafchamps and Minten (2002) find that measures of 
the size of an individual trader’s business network are positively associated with value 
added and total sales.  The paper argues that a relationship between networks and these 
economic outcomes may be understood in the context of models of imperfect information 
and monitoring, which provides a clear theoretical motivation for the empirical 
framework as well as a plausible theoretical interpretation for the various findings. 
Finally, it should be noted that while the different studies in Table 1 consistently 
support a role for social capital in facilitating various economic outcomes, two of the 
studies, Krishna (2001) and Varughese and Ostrom (2001), argue that there are important 
subtleties in this relationship that need to be accounted for.   Krishna (2001) finds that for 
villages in Rajastan India, the relationship between conventional social capital measures 
and outcomes such as common land development and poverty reduction is sensitive to a 
notion of effective governance Krishna calls “capable agency.”  By capable agency, 
Krishna refers to factors such as strong leadership in organizations, frequent interactions 
between villagers and clients, etc.  His argument is that the density of organizations, a 
variable often used to measure social capital, will be associated with socially better 
outcomes only when capable agency is present.  Varughese and Ostrom (2001) find, 
based on a study of groups of forest users in Nepal, that levels of collective action are not 
well predicted by measures of ethnic, caste, and religious homogeneity within these 
groups.  These sorts of variables are often used to proxy for social capital. Varughese and 
Ostrom (2001) conclude that institutional design, how decisions are made, etc, can 
overcome barriers to cooperation that are induced by heterogeneity.  Taken together, 
these studies illustrate that successful group activities depend on more than the presence 
of social ties per se.  
  
  47Social capital in OECD societies 
 
Just as social capital has been used to explain a range of outcomes in developing 
economies, so it has been used to explain a range of US phenomena.  Table 2 reports a 
number of such studies. 
In comparing Tables 1 and 2, a number of differences may be identified.  First, 
social capital studies for affluent societies are far more heterogeneous than those which 
we report for developing economies.  One finds studies of social capital for the United 
States that explore outcomes ranging from mental health (Furstenburg and Hughes 
(1995)) to dropping out of high school (Teachman, Paasch, and Carver (1997)) to 
criminal activity (Hagan and McCarthy (1995)). We do not believe this reflects 
differences in our choices of what studies to report. Rather, interest in social capital in 
advanced societies has been motivated by different phenomena than in the case of 
developing economies. In particular, the focus on social capital appears to be motivated 
by a desire to understand how some individuals avoid self-harming behaviors of various 
types. 
Second, social capital studies for affluent societies focus on somewhat different 
variables to proxy for social capital than their development counterparts.  This may be 
seen in the frequent examination of parental influences in Table 2.  A common 
assumption in studies for the US is that the parent, child, neighborhood and school 
relationships are a primary form of social capital.  McNeal (1999), for example, explicitly 
argues that parent/child interactions closely correspond to what Coleman originally meant 
by social capital.   
Another feature that distinguishes the literature on OECD societies is its focus on 
traditionally sociological concepts in construing social capital. One important notion is 
intergenerational closure, which holds when parents of a given child know both his 
friends as well as his friends’ parents; both Morgan and Sorenson (1999a) and Sandefur, 
Meier, and Hernandez (1999) treat closure as an important aspect of social capital.  This 
variable arises because, as argued originally in Coleman (1988), control and monitoring 
of children is sensitive to the ways that a family is embedded in a community. 
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those available for developing countries, these studies often suffer from serious flaws.  
One problem is that little discipline has been imposed on the empirical proxies used for 
social capital, which makes many of the empirical claims in this literature incredible.  For 
example, authors such as Furstenburg and Hughes (1995), McNeal (1999) and Sandefur, 
Meier, and Hernandez (1999) treat the number of family moves as a measure of social 
capital for youths. The idea is that the more a family moves, the weaker the social ties 
between the youth and his community.  This is certainly a plausible claim. However, it 
does not suffice to make family moves a valid social capital measure.  Since moves are 
endogenous, the variable in essence provides an indictor for those characteristics that 
determine the moves.  Such characteristics can be associated with different youth 
outcomes for reasons that have nothing to do with social capital. For example, families 
who make more moves plausibly contain parents who are less interested in their children 
than those who make fewer, since such parents may be putting less weight on the costs to 
children of changing neighborhoods.  Parents with less interest in their children (which 
can be formalized by using Loury’s (1981) model of intergenerational mobility and 
allowing for heterogeneity in the rates at which parents discount offspring utility) will 
presumably invest less in their children, altering their outcomes in ways similar to the 
purported effects of lower social capital.  Our point is not that one explanation or the 
other is correct, but rather that neither is identified from the data.  Put differently, there 
are good reasons to believe that there are systematic differences in the unexplained 
components of individual behavior that render standard estimation methods inconsistent; 
specifically, families asserted to posses high levels of social capital, from the perspective 
of the estimated model, may be expected to be associated with higher levels of parental 
interest in children, which means the residuals in the associated regressions no longer 
have conditional expectations of 0. As such, this discussion is an illustration of an 
exchangeability violation of the type discussed in Section III; Furstenberg and Hughes 
(1995) are especially susceptible to this criticism due to the lack of attention to control 
variables.  
Similarly, little attention is typically given to the identification problem of 
distinguishing social capital from endogenous or other group effects.  This failure derives 
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propensity to behave similarly to one’s peers a form of social capital?  The answer to this 
question is unclear from the literature, since such a propensity could easily count as a 
type of social norm. 
While none of the studies in Table 2 can be said to fully address these general 
statistical questions, some of the studies are nevertheless clearly valuable contributions.  
One paper we would identify is Morgan and Sorenson (1999a).  This paper is noteworthy 
for its careful attention to different causal mechanisms by which social capital may 
matter and by the care with which empirical proxies are constructed.  We would also note 
that the paper focuses on a very specific issue, namely why Catholic schools appear to 
outperform their public counterparts, where there are good prior reasons to believe social 
factors matter.
18  Palloni et al (2001) is in many ways a very different study, yet is also 
very admirable. This analysis focuses on a very simple notion of social capital, in 
studying the effect on an individual’s migration decision of prior migration by a sibling. 
What commends this study is the immense care taken to deal with questions of 
unobserved heterogeneity and common factors between siblings unrelated to social 
capital. 
Before leaving this section, we draw attention to Costa and Kahn (2003b), which 
provides an historical perspective on social capital.  In this paper, the behavior of union 
soldiers in the Civil War is examined, with particular attention to rates of promotion and 
desertion across different companies of soldiers.  Costa and Kahn find that ethnic and 
occupational homogeneity of companies was conducive to braver conduct by soldiers. 
While far removed from the types of behaviors that are usually studied using social 
capital, the behavior of soldiers is in fact an excellent phenomenon to examine, given the 
                                                           
18 Morgan and Sorenson (1999a) has in fact engendered some controversy, see Carbonaro  
(1999) and Hallinan and Kubitschek (1999). The main thrust of these criticisms concerns 
the extent to which the social closure measures used by Morgan and Sorenson fully 
capture the relevant social dynamics. We believe that the rejoinder Morgan and Sorenson 
(1999b) effectively answers these objections; equally important, these objections do not 
mitigate the reasons we admire the study. The level at which debate on this paper 
occurred is far deeper than the great majority of efforts to link social capital concepts to 
data. 
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19  We believe creative 
exploration of data sets like this can add a great deal to the understanding of social 
capital.  
 
V.ii. Aggregate studies 
 
  At the beginning of Section III, we outlined the difficulty of estimating the 
beneficial effects of social capital from individual data. We now turn to empirical studies 
that rely on aggregate data and examine whether they provide more convincing evidence 
of social capital. Table 3 reports a number of social capital studies that employ such data.  
As the Table indicates, a large number of aggregate level social capital studies have 
focused on the relationship between social capital and per capita output growth at a high 
level of aggregation, such as a country or region.  As such, most of the studies of this 
type are variants on empirical growth regressions that have become a workhorse of 
modern growth economics.
20 An assessment of the aggregate studies using social capital 
is therefore essentially equivalent to an assessment of a set of growth regressions 
designed to establish that a particular variable is causally related to growth. 
Growth regressions of the type found in the studies of Table 3 have been 
subjected to very serious methodological criticisms; examples include Brock and Durlauf 
(2001b), Durlauf (2000), Durlauf and Quah (1999), and Temple (2000).  As argued in 
these papers, growth regressions suffer from several fundamental problems that make 
implausible the types of causal inferences one typically finds in the empirical literature.  
First, there is the problem of the choice of control variables.  Growth theories are open-
ended, which means that one growth theory does not have any logical implications for the 
truth or falsity of another.  Hence, there is no natural way, when one wishes to test the 
importance of a given theory, to identify the appropriate set of theories to incorporate in a 
correctly specified structural growth model.  As Durlauf and Quah (1999) indicate, there 
                                                           
19To be clear, social factors can play a negative role in military behavior, such as in 
violence against civilians. See Aaronson (1999) for discussion of the social dynamics that 
occurred among US soldiers during the My Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians. 
20See Durlauf and Quah (1999) and Temple (1999) for surveys of the methods and 
findings of the empirical growth literature. 
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supposed to apply.  As a result, any given growth regression may be subjected to the 
criticism that relevant control variables have been omitted.  While there are some 
possible ways to deal with this problem, see Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001), this 
problem has not been addressed in any social capital and growth studies, as far as we 
know.   
Second, growth regressions typically fail to account properly for parameter 
heterogeneity across countries.  Evidence of such heterogeneity may be found in 
Desdoigts (1999), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin 
(2001); theoretical models that imply heterogeneous growth processes for different 
groups of countries include Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes 
(2002).  Failure to account for parameter heterogeneity calls into question the structural 
interpretation of a social capital variable as it may be proxying for this form of 
heterogeneity.  One example that is suggestive of this possibility concerns the role of 
ethnic heterogeneity in growth, a question studied by Easterly and Levine (1997).
21  In 
this paper, the authors argue that ethnic conflict inhibits public good creation and so acts 
as an impediment to growth.  Ethnic conflict is instrumented with a measure of 
ethnolinguistic diversity which proves to be strongly negatively associated with growth.  
Since sub-Saharan Africa has exceptionally high levels of ethnolinguistic diversity, the 
authors conclude that this is an important mechanism in understanding Africa’s growth 
problems. Brock and Durlauf (2001a) reexamine this study, allowing for various types of 
exchangeability violations due to parameter heterogeneity, and find that the relationship 
between ethnolinguistic diversity and growth appears only for sub-Saharan Africa; this 
variable does not help explain growth patterns in the rest of the world.  Brock and 
Durlauf’s finding illustrates how growth explanations may well not be constant across 
countries. And for the African case, it is unclear whether the growth findings are causal 
or whether ethnolinguistic diversity simply proxies for some other form of “African 
exceptionalism.” 
                                                           
21It should be noted that Easterly and Levine (1997) does not explicitly focus on social 
capital; however, the mechanisms by which ethnic heterogeneity can affect economic 
performance are in many cases the same as have been proposed in the social capital 
literature. 
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not meet the exchangeability requirements that we discussed in Section III.  While this 
reflects more general failings of the empirical growth literature (Brock and Durlauf 
(2001b)), it is also the case that growth studies using social capital have been quite 
insensitive to efforts in the growth literature to address these problems.   
Beyond questions concerning the comparability of observations, there are 
unresolved issues concerning causal interpretation of growth regressions that apply to the 
social capital case. This is especially important given the endogeneity of aggregate 
measures of social capital.  We are unaware of any social capital study using aggregate 
data that addresses causality versus correlation for social capital and growth in a 
persuasive way.  While this is a broad brush with which to tar this empirical literature, we 
believe it is valid.  A related problem is that we are unaware of any compelling 
instrumental variables for social capital in these regressions.  This failure is a corollary of 
the absence of any strong theories of aggregate social capital determination in the social 
science literature that would allow one to characterize appropriate instruments. 
When one turns from national-level growth studies to other aggregate studies, the 
plausibility of claims concerning social capital becomes stronger in some cases.  A recent 
study by Goldin and Katz (1999) is particularly interesting in its focus on the sources for 
the rise of high school attendance in Iowa in the early part of the twentieth century.  By 
focusing on characteristics of Iowa counties, they are able to avoid some of the clear 
problems of exchangeability that plague studies using coarser levels of aggregation. But 
even here, other problems arise: more important, the data available are quite weak in the 
sense that the variables which suggest the presence of social capital effects could equally 
well suggest alternative explanations.  The specific variables that seem most suggestive 
of social capital effects are the percentage of native born citizens and the population of 
towns; high percentages of native born and low population sizes are each associated with 
higher high school attendance.  Clearly, linking these correlations to a causal role for 
social capital or other type of social influence is speculative. To be fair, Goldin and Katz 
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having fewer opportunities for those without high school educations.
22
Overall, we conclude that aggregate social capital studies have not been 
successful in providing compelling empirical evidence on the effects of social capital.  
These studies require identifying assumptions that are incredible by conventional social 
science reasoning.  We believe that research efforts should be directed towards micro-
level studies as the problems with country-wide studies seem too intractable to overcome.  
Data at lower levels of aggregation, such as county data for a homogeneous place like 
1915 Iowa, are likely to be more amenable to persuasive analysis, provided the issues of 
exchangeability and identification can be addressed adequately. 
 
 
VI. Empirical studies of the level and determinants of social capital 
 
Interest in the effects of social capital has spawned a related literature of the level 
of social capital and how this level is determined.  Table 4 lists a range of studies that 
have explored this issue.  It is worth noting that while attention has been given to 
questions of model specification and identification for models in which social capital is a 
causal determinant of various outcomes, we are unaware of any formal analyses that have 
been applied to models of social capital formation. Our conjecture is that the arguments 
applied to models of social capital effects can be extended in a straightforward fashion to 
models of social capital determinants, but this remains to be done. 
One important question in the literature on the formation of social capital has 
been whether the extremely prominent claims by Putnam (1995,2000) that social capital 
in the United States has experienced a major decline are correct, and if so, whether this 
decline can be attributed to those factors he has described, namely, increased watching of 
television and the passing of the World War II generation.  It appears that many of 
Putnam’s claims have not withstood careful scrutiny.  Paxton (1999) shows that there is 
                                                           
22At the other extreme, the effort by Robison and Siles (1999) to link aspects of state 
level income distributions to various social capital proxies fails to make any serious effort 
to ensure exchangeability; in addition the variables used to measure social capital, such as 
labor force participation, render the claims made about social capital untenable. 
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States. Bianchi and Robinson (1997) find little evidence that patterns of television 
viewing have much relationship to maternal employment status or other family factors 
often asserted to lead to lower social capital. Costa and Kahn (2003a), using more 
disaggregated measures of associational activity, find declines in social capital measures 
that are qualitatively similar to what Putnam has claimed.  However, they find rather 
different explanations.  Their analysis concludes that the decline in social capital 
produced “outside the home” such as volunteering is explained to a large extent by the 
rise in female labor force participation in the last 4 decades.  This study also finds that 
declines in social capital produced “inside the home” such as frequency of socializing is 
strongly related to increases in neighborhood heterogeneity.   One important implication 
of this work is that it places claims about a decline in US social capital in a different 
normative light.  If increasing female labor force participation is due to the breakdown of 
discriminatory barriers against women in labor markets and if increasing neighborhood 
heterogeneity reflects a breakdown of the levels of social and ethnic segregation in the 
United States, then perhaps declines in social capital are best thought of as an unfortunate 
but necessary side effect of a movement towards a more just society and so should not be 
mourned. 
One important aspect of this research is the move towards a causal understanding 
of the processes by which social capital is formed.  One interesting example of such work 
is Brehm and Rahn (1997) who employ General Social Survey data to study the 
reciprocal interaction of community involvement and trust in others.  Their analysis finds 
a stronger causal relationship between community participation to trust than the converse.  
This finding is indicative of the empirical importance of Dasgupta’s (2002) argument that 
social capital should be modeled as a network.   
Other studies have focused on identifying predictors of trust.  For the US, Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2002) find that trust in others is negatively associated with community 
heterogeneity.  Rahn and Rudolph (2002) extend work of this type in an analysis of the 
determinants of trust in local government.  This paper finds that political culture and 
community heterogeneity play an important role in explaining trust. Interestingly, trust 
does not appear to be influenced by the form of local government as trust levels are not 
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popular control of local government).  These studies are best regarded as reduced form 
analyses in that issues of causality are not specifically addressed.  
An especially important effort to understand the formation of social capital is the 
Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN).  This is a 
remarkably detailed data collection project that covers several hundred neighborhoods in 
Chicago. These data are proving to be very useful in delineating the detailed social 
structure of neighborhoods. As described in Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999 pg. 
639), the available data include responses to questions such as “About how often do you 
and people in your neighborhood do favors for each other?” and the likelihood that one’s 
neighbors would intervene if one’s child were observed skipping school. 
Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999) use the PHDCN to study a range of social 
aspects of neighborhoods. In particular, they distinguish the social capital of a 
neighborhood as “the resource potential of personal and organizational networks” (pg. 
635) from the collective efficacy of a neighborhood, “a task-specific construct that relates 
to the shared expectations and mutual engagement by adults in the active support and 
social control of children.” (pg. 635). The purpose of this distinction is to differentiate 
general notions of neighborhood social resources from the use of these resources. By 
delineating how neighborhood members help one another, for example through 
monitoring one another’s children, Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999) give a rich 
portrait of how neighborhoods benefit their members, illustrating how help in 
childrearing or trust among neighbors are important mediating variables in understanding 
why poor neighborhoods have adverse effects on their members.  By uncovering specific 
mechanisms by which neighborhoods matter, this study moves beyond the common use 
of social capital variables in which the link between the variable and a behavioral 
outcome is metaphorical and all too often a black box. 
 
 
VII.   Suggestions for future research 
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been unpersuasive.  We make the following suggestions as to how one can improve this 
literature. 
First, empirical analyses need to step back from grandiose approaches to social 
capital and focus on the more mundane but potentially far more fruitful task of analyzing 
specific social components to individual behavior.  This does not require abandonment of 
social capital as a general organizing idea or metaphor, but rather means that evidence in 
favor of social capital should be derived from specific claims about social influences on 
individuals.  
A useful contrast may be made between the Helliwell and Putnam (2000) paper, 
the study of regional differences in growth rates in Italy that we have criticized earlier, 
and a recent study by Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) that explores the 
determinants of trust.  Rather than run regressions that make incredible assumptions 
about the exchangeability of regional growth rates, Glaeser Laibson, Scheinkman and 
Soutter employ well crafted experiments to see how attitudes and background 
characteristics influence the choice of strategies in various economic experiments.  In the 
context of these experiments, notions such as trust are quite well defined since it amounts 
to expectations about the play of other agents in the game.  This well defined 
environment provides much more compelling evidence of how trust influences behavior 
than can be obtained from ad hoc regressions.  The use of experiments to understand 
social capital is further developed in Carter and Castillo (2003,2004), who consider how 
variation in roles by players in economic experiments can allow for differentiation 
between altruism and trust as determinants of behaviors. 
The importance of experimental evidence should not be exaggerated.  Economic 
experiments are not a panacea for the limits of inference with observational data.  One 
problem is generalizability; it is far from clear how behavior in economic experiments 
maps into behavior in the larger economy and society, although Glaeser Laibson, 
Scheinkman and Soutter  make an important advance in this regard by attempting to 
correlate behavior in experiments with behavior in the “real world” by participants.   
Further, as discussed by Manski (2002) in an important recent paper, there are 
identification problems in experiments as it is often difficult to distinguish behavior that 
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expectations of trustworthy behavior by others.  Nevertheless, Glaeser Laibson, 
Scheinkman and Soutter and Carter and Castillo represent a style of research that is an 
important advance in the social capital literature. 
In addition, moving the discussion of social capital away from generalities to 
specific mechanisms in the way we suggest will allow one to deal with issues of 
endogeneity and exchangeability more effectively, since it will facilitate more precise and 
comprehensive modeling of causal mechanisms than one finds in the social capital 
literature.  While the great majority of social capital studies include numerous control 
variables, the choice of these variables is rarely determined by careful delineation of the 
determinants of behavior of the agents under study.  In addition, there has been little 
attention to questions of parameter heterogeneity. 
A concrete implication of this discussion is that future research on social capital 
by the World Bank, for example, should be careful about the use of highly aggregated 
data.  It is difficult to make compelling exchangeability arguments for data sets in which 
the observations are countries or regions.  Ad hoc assumptions concerning the legitimacy 
of instrumental variables have plagued this literature for good reason: theories of social 
capital formation are underdeveloped so that it is difficult for researchers to sensibly 
construct aggregate measures of social capital. 
Second, we believe that future data collection exercises must explicitly attempt to 
gather information on group-level influences, rather than on social capital alone.  This 
should include measures of the quality of leadership. At the core of virtually all 
microeconomic reasoning is the general idea that decisions are purposeful outcomes 
based on an individual’s preferences over outcomes, constraints on what actions are 
feasible, and beliefs over the consequences of those actions.  The new social economics 
(cf. Durlauf and Young (2001)), is based upon the recognition that these three 
components to decisions are deeply influenced by social factors.  A data collection 
exercise designed to explain a given set of outcomes should therefore be based on the 
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and the development of plausible empirical analogs to these social factors.
23
The sorts of detailed data collection we advocate are in fact underway in some 
cases. In particular, the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods and 
data collection based on the World Bank Social Capital Assessment Tool are exemplary.  
In each case, the levels of specificity in terms of uncovering how individuals interact in 
villages, communities and social networks is a great advance over the crude measures 
often used in social capital studies. The most obvious suggestion in terms of the design of 
these studies would be the exploration of the extent to which the existing survey 
questions are adequate in terms of dealing with the specification and identification 
problems we discuss in Section III.  There is no quick answer to this as it would require 
integrating some theoretical modeling with the survey design.  Nevertheless, the payoffs 
to such an endeavor could be quite high.   
How does our admittedly very general advice differ from the way in which data 
collection on social capital is typically done?  We have already discussed one difference, 
namely, the effectiveness of data collection is augmented when attention is paid to the 
uses to which the data will be applied. To repeat, the analysis of potential identification 
problems should inform data collection and not just define limits to which a data set may 
be used.  Another important difference is that this approach avoids privileging social 
factors that can be construed as “social capital” over others.  As we have argued, the 
failure to consider alternative social explanations to social capital is an important source 
of skepticism with respect to existing studies.  More importantly, there is no a priori 
reason to assume that social capital is a more likely source of important effects than other 
social factors. Another difference is that our proposed approach, by separating social 
factors as concepts from empirical measurement, will avoid conflating the two, as often 
                                                           
23 Sandefur and Laumann (1998) argue in favor of understanding social capital in terms 
of its benefits, identifying these as provision of information, influence and control in 
dealing with others, social solidarity between individuals.  These types of benefits 
represent combinations of the preferences, constraints, and beliefs we advocate 
employing. An advantage of our approach is that our categories represent empirically 
meaningful differences in the determinants of individual behavior whereas the Sandefur 
and Laumann categories are necessarily interdependent and do not correspond to any 
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meant by social factors should provide some guidance as to the appropriate levels at 
which these factors should be measured.  Does an individual’s or a society’s level of trust 
matter for individual conduct?  The appropriate answer to a question like this should 
derive from the decision problem at hand.  Empirical studies of social capital have largely 
not addressed this question.       
Third, there needs to be greater recognition of the limits to statistical analysis in 
contexts such as the evaluation of social capital.  This is partly a restatement of the first 
suggestion in that there simply do not exist any available data or methodology that can 
allow an assessment of the broad claims of the sort one finds in the social capital 
literature.  But beyond this, we believe economists need to be more receptive to the sorts 
of evidence found in other disciplines beyond the quantitative analyses that are standard 
in economics.  For example, sustained descriptive histories can teach us much about the 
ways that social structures influence individual conduct even if they are not constructed 
in the form of claims about F-statistics and the like.  At the other extreme, there is a 
wealth of information in the social psychology literature that addresses in precise ways 
the inchoate ideas about individual behavior that underlie the social capital literature.  
This suggestion requires greater openmindedness on the part of economists to 
nonstatistical sources of information. But the payoffs can be high both in terms of 
substantive understanding as well as in facilitating quantitative analyses. As the 
discussion of identification argued, social capital effects can only be revealed if one has 
prior information on what group effects do not directly influence individuals.  This is 
information that nonstatistical studies may be able to provide.
24
In fact, it is reasonable to argue that some aspects of the question of how social 
capital has facilitated socioeconomic or political development should be treated in the 
same spirit as questions such as what led to rise of emergence of democracy in ancient 
Athens versus a martial culture in ancient Sparta or what were the causes of World War I.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
“natural kinds” in terms of either individual activity or collective action, at least as far as 
we can tell. For example, trust will affect information transmission. 
24 Of course, qualitative studies are not immune to the overinterpretation (due to ignoring 
identification problems) and overclaiming (due to exaggeration of the import of statistical 
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quantitative precision with which such questions can be answered and what it means to 
say the question has been answered.  None of this suggests that statistical analysis should 
play anything other than a primary role in social capital studies; our argument is that the 
credibility of the social capital literature will be augmented when nonstatistical evidence 




VIII.   Conclusions 
 
In this Chapter, we have tried to provide an overview of the state of social capital 
research by both describing the state of the conceptual, theoretical and econometric 
literatures on social capital and by surveying a number of empirical studies.  Our overall 
assessment of the social capital research is quite mixed.  In terms of conceptual and 
theoretical studies of social capital, there is a considerable amount of ambiguity and 
confusion as to what social capital means.  One conclusion we draw from our survey is 
that the most successful theoretical work on social capital is that which, following 
Dasgupta (2002), models social capital as a form of social network structure and uses the 
presence of that structure to understand how individual outcomes are affected in 
equilibrium. From the empirical perspective, the role of networks in facilitating exchange 
is one of the most compelling empirical findings in the social capital literature (cf. 
Fafchamps (2004)), so a more narrow focus on this type will likely not diminish the 
importance of social capital as a concept.   
With respect to empirical work in general, social capital research has led to the 
development of a number of interesting data sets as well as the development of a number 
of provocative hypotheses, much of the empirical literature is at best suggestive and at 
worst easy to discount.  So while one can point to no end of studies in which a variable 
that is asserted to proxy for social capital has some effect on individuals or groups, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
findings taken on their own terms) that we have criticized in quantitative studies.  See 
Tarrow (1996) for criticisms along these lines. 
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We have highlighted a number of studies that we think are particularly strong, but those 
studies we find persuasive are relatively exceptional.  The defects of the empirical social 
capital literature are unfortunate, since the work on social capital is an active front in 
which the “undersocialized conception of man” for which economics has been criticized 
(Granovetter (1985)) is being addressed.   
One recommendation we make in regard to empirical studies is that social capital 
literature pay far more attention to formal issues of identification, self-selection and 
unobserved group characteristics.  These issues have been extensively studied in the 
closely related context of social interactions (cf. Brock and Durlauf (2001c)) and many 
ideas from that literature may be applied to social capital.  In addition, we believe that 
empirical social capital studies must do a much better job of differentiating between 
social capital effects and alternative types of group effects.  
Attempts to provide social richness to economic analysis will only succeed if the 
theoretical and empirical work that accompanies this effort is subjected to the same 
rigorous standards that are required of other analyses in economics.  In contrast, the 
extravagant claims so often found in this literature (an outstanding example of which is 
Putnam (2000) who appears capable of attributing every conceivable societal virtue to 
social capital)
25 have little prospect of having lasting social science value. Beyond the 
failure to contribute to the social science enterprise, there is a legitimate concern that 
studies which make excessive claims and unsupported assertions can discredit social 
capital as an idea.  In conclusion, what the empirical social capital literature ultimately 
needs is more matter and less art. 
 
                                                           
25See Durlauf (2002b) for an extended critique of Putnam (2000) which addresses the 
problem of overclaiming, faulting Putnam both for not dealing with some of the 
identification problems we hve described in Section IV as well as for failing to analyze 
social capital in a fashion conducive to rigorous policy analysis. 
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TABLE 1: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 








Child height for age  Number of associations in 
community and interaction of 
family income with community 
income  
Social capital helps 





Food traders in 
Madagascar 
Value added and total 
sales 
Number of traders known, 
number of relatives in 
agricultural trade, number of 
potential informal traders 
Number of traders known 
and number of potential 
informal traders statistically 
significant. 
Grootaert (2000)  Rural households in 
Indonesia 
Per capita household 
expenditure 
Number of memberships in 
associations, diversity of 
memberships, number of 
meetings of associations, index 
of participation in 
decisionmaking, measure of 
cash contribution to 
associations, measure of time 
contribution to association, 
measure of orientation towards 
community. 
Social capital index 
statistically significant; 
number of memberships, 
internal heterogeneity of 
associations and level of 
participation in 
decisionmaking appear most 
important. 
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TABLE 1: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
STUDY AGENTS  OUTCOMES  SOCIAL  CAPITAL 
MEASURES 
FINDINGS 
Isham (2002)  Households in rural 
Tanzania 
Adoption of improved 
fertilizer 
Village level measures of ethnic 
homogeneity for organizations 
in which households are 
members, levels of participation 
of household in organization 
decisionmaking, and extent to 
which  leaders of village 
organization have different 
livelihoods than village 
members 
Social capital measures are 
generally statistically 
significant predictors of 
adoption, but some regional 
differences exist 
Krishna (2001)  Villages in 
Rajastan, India 
Performance with 




Survey measures of 
participation in labor-sharing 
groups, trust, solidarity, and 
reciprocity 
Efficacy of social capital is 
related to strength of leaders 






Collective action to 
restore degraded or 
vulnerable common 
lands 
Social capital index based on 
survey answers to questions on 
level of collective action in 
village, village governance, 
village sense of obligation, etc. 
Index is a strong predictor of 
better development 
outcomes 
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TABLE 1: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
STUDY AGENTS  OUTCOMES  SOCIAL  CAPITAL 
MEASURES 
FINDINGS 
Lee and Brinton 
(1996) 
Graduates of elite 
colleges in South 
Korea 
Employment 
opportunities at large 
firms 
Private social capital (family 
and friendship ties) and 
institutional social capital 
(social ties provided by 
university, eg. introductions to 
firms) 
Institutional rather than 
private social capital is 
important in determining 
employment opportunities 
Malucccio, 






Per capita total 
expenditure 
Index of individual 
memberships in groups, 
reflecting number, gender 
heterogeneity, and performance, 
based on survey responses. 
Community social capital levels 
computed as aggregates of 
individual indices 
Individual and community 
social capital measures 
statistically significantly 
associated with expenditure 




Households in rural 
Tanzania 
Per capita household 
expenditure 
 
Social capital indices 
constructed for both households 
and villages.  Indices based on 
memberships in groups, 
characteristics of the groups, 
and household values and 
attitudes 
Village social capital 




et al (2001) 
Sibling pairs in 
Mexico 
Migration to the United 
States 
 
Previous migration of one 
sibling 
 
Likelihood of migration is 
increased if a sibling has 
already migrated 
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TABLE 1: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
STUDY AGENTS  OUTCOMES  SOCIAL  CAPITAL 
MEASURES 
FINDINGS 









Indices of trust, reciprocity, and 
sharing for neighborhoods 
Reciprocity index is best 
predictor of likelihood that a  
neighborhood has  
VWSM system  
Varughese and 
Ostrom (2001) 
Groups of forest 
users in Nepal 
Level of collective 
activity, monitoring of 
forest use, enforcement 
of harvesting constraints, 
etc. 
Homogeneity within group in 
wealth, caste, ethnicity 
No necessary relationship 
between homogeneity and 
level of collective action; 
institutional design is more 
important 
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TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: OECD COUNTRIES 
 
STUDY          ACTORS OUTCOMES SOCIAL  CAPITAL  MEASURES FINDINGS
Costa and Kahn 
(2003b) 
Union soldiers in 
the US Civil War 
Performance over course of 
war in terms of promotions, 
desertion, etc. 
Homogeneity of companies of 
soldiers with respect to ethnicity, 
occupation, and age 
More homogeneous 
companies are 
associated with more 
promotions and lower 






Returns to investments  Use of employees social networks 
in making new hires 
Investment in use of 
employee referrals is 










Business dealings with one 
another 
Reciprocity, trust. Actors are 
organized into subgroups based 
on friendship ties. Trust, equated 
with absence of hostile business 
actions, such as a hostile takeover, 
is expected to be higher between 
members of common subgroup. 
Reciprocity, defined as supportive 
actions such as helping a firm 
fend off a hostile takeover is 
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TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: OECD COUNTRIES 
 






Graduation from high 
school, college enrollment, 
economic status, avoidance 
of live birth, avoidance of 
criminal activity, mental 
health 
Within family social capital 
(presence of father in home, 
parents’ expectations for school 
performance, etc.), family links to 
community (religious 
involvement, help network, 
neighborhood quality, etc.) 
Various outcomes and 
social capital measures 
statistically 
significantly associated, 
even controlling for 





Households in Italy Financial activities such as  
use of formal credit, 
portfolio behavior 
Electoral participation and blood 
donation and province level 
Social capital measures 
for both current 
location and place of 
birth predict use of 
formal credit, and 
investment in stocks 
rather than cash. Effects 
stronger for the poorer 






Level of educational 
attainment, occupational 
status 
Parental involvement  with 
children,  family moves across 
neighborhoods 
Both types of social 
capital statistically 






Various forms of criminal 
behavior 
Social variables such as criminal 
mentors and criminal social 
networks  
Social variables predict 
criminality  
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TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: OECD COUNTRIES 
 
STUDY ACTORS  OUTCOMES  SOCIAL  CAPITAL  MEASURES  FINDINGS 
McNeal (1999)  Teenagers in US  Academic achievement in 
science, truancy, staying in 
school 
Parental interactions with child 
and with school 
Favorable social capital 
effects on child 
outcomes seem only to 
apply to white students 




Teenagers in US  Test scores in mathematics  Social closure around school, 
parental involvement in school, 
parental knowledge of friends 
Social closure is 
negatively associated 
with test scores, in 
contradiction to 
standard predictions of 
social capital analyses 
Parcel and 
Menaghan (1993) 
Children in US  Index of child behavioral 
problems 
Miscellaneous measures of family 
structure, parents’ working 
conditions, and parents’ personal 
resources, such as sense of self-
estimation 







Teenagers in US  Intergenerational closure, 
parent/child interactions, 
high school graduation, 
post-secondary enrollment, 
enrolling in a four-year 
college 
Family structure, number of times 
child changed schools, Catholic 
High school attendance 
Various social capital 
measures are associated 
with outcomes in ways 
predicted by theory. 
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TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: OECD COUNTRIES 
 
STUDY ACTORS  OUTCOMES  SOCIAL  CAPITAL  MEASURES  FINDINGS 
Sun (1999)  Teenagers (US)  Academic performance 
measured by test scores 
Structural measures (number of 
school changes, family structure) 
and process variables (parent 
child interactions, participation in 




with test scores. 
Teachman, Paasch, 
and Carver (1997) 
Teenagers (US) 
 
Dropping out of high 
school 
Family social capital (living 
arrangements with parents, 
intensity of interactions with 
parents), community social capital 
(attendance in Catholic school, 
number of changes in school, 
measures of interactions of 
parents with schools and friends) 
Attending a Catholic 
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TABLE 3: AGGREGATE-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 




van Schalk (2001) 
European Regions  Per capita output growth  Trust, group participation  Group participation helps 




Nations  Per capita output growth  Ethnic heterogeneity 
measured by 
ethnolinguistic diversity 
within a country 
Per capita growth 
negatively associated with 
ethnolinguistic 




Goldin and Katz 
(1999) 
Iowa Counties in 1915  High school attendance  Population size of towns, 
density of religious 
organizations, percentage 
of population that is native 
born  
Small towns led expansion 
of high school attendance. 
Positive relationship with 
other possible social 
capital variables 
Helliwell (1996)  Asian nations  Per capita output growth  Participation in 
associations, trust 
Social capital measures 
contribute little once other 
factors such as openness 
are accounted for 
  71 
TABLE 3: AGGREGATE-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 





Regions in Italy  Per capita output growth  Measure of civic 
community (index of 
associations, newspaper 





For the various measures, 
higher social capital 
associated with higher 
growth 
Knack and Keefer 
(1997) 
Nations  Per capita output growth  Indices of civic cooperation 
(measuring questions such 
as whether it is ever 
justified to cheat on taxes) 
and trust (percentage of 
individuals who say most 
people can be trusted) 
Social capital measures 
help predict growth 
LaPorta et al 
(1997) 
Nations Government  efficiency
(level of corruption, etc.), 
participation in politics 
and associations, social 
efficiency (infrastructure 
quality, infant mortality, 
educational level, etc.)  
  Trust  Trust generally statistically 
significant 
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TABLE 3: AGGREGATE-LEVEL STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
 




Brennan, and Buka 
(2003) 
Chicago neighborhoods  Aggregate and disease-
specific mortality rates for 
neighborhoods and gender 
and ethnic groups within 
neighborhoods 
Measures of trust, 
reciprocity, group 
participation 
Social capital measures 
help to predict white 
mortality; relationship 
with mortality of  blacks is 
weaker 
Paxton (2002)  Nations  Index of liberal 
democracy 
Number and types of  
international 
nongovernment 
organization in country, 
trust 
Democracy and social 
capital reciprocally related; 
number of trade unions, 
sport associations and 
religious organizations 
negatively associated with 
democracy, number of 
others positively 
associated 
Robison and Siles 
(1999) 
US states  Means and coefficients of 
variation for household 
income 
Measures of family 
structure, educational 
achievement, crime and 
labor force participation 
Higher social capital 
proxies generally 
associated with higher 
means and lower 
dispersion in household 
income 
Zak and Knack 
(2001) 
Nations  Per capita output growth  Trust  Trust predicts growth even 
when factors such as 
property rights are 
controlled for. 
  




TABLE 4: STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 





Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2002) 
Adults in US  Trust  Miscellaneous personal and 
community characteristics 
Low social capital measures 
for individuals are 
associated with 
membership in groups that 
have experienced 
discrimination (e.g. being 
African American), lack of 
economic success, 
community heterogeneity, 






Time spent on studying 
and activities other than 
watching television 
Family structure, parental 
characteristics, mother’s labor 
force status 
Study is higher and 
television watching lower 
among children of better 
educated; children of 
working mothers watch less 
television than others 
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TABLE 4: STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 





Brehm and Rahn 
(1997) 
Adults in US   Civic engagement and 
civic trust 
Reciprocal relationship 
between engagement and trust, 
confidence in institutions, life 
satisfaction, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, and 
many others 
Participation strongly 
affects trust, each positively 
associated with  
socioeconomic status, 
confidence, negatively 
associated with being black 
Charles and Kline 
(2002) 
Adults in US   Carpooling  Ethnicity of neighbors  Ethnic heterogeneity 
reduces social capital 
formation for some 
pairings, notably whites and 
blacks and whites and 
Hispanics 





Adults in US   Volunteering, socializing, 
non-church memberships,  
Gender, community 
characteristics (race and 
income heterogeneity)  
Declines in social capital 
produced outside the home 
such as volunteering are 
strongly related to higher 
female labor force 
participation; declining 
social capital within home 
such as frequency of  
socializing is  strongly 
related to higher 
community heterogeneity 
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TABLE 4: STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 







Adults in US   Citizenship (voting in local 
elections, helping solve 
local problems, knows 
school head, etc.) 
Home ownership  Homeownership helps 





Traders in Benin, 
Madagascar, and 
Malawi 
Trust in trading 
relationships 
Ethnicity and religious 
similarity, gender, network 
effects 
Ethnicity, religion and 
gender appear to have little 
effect on trust. Individuals 
possessing large numbers of 
business contacts give and 






projects in  western 
Kenya 
For women’s groups, 
group size, attendance, 
financial status, and level 
of interactions with other 
groups and individuals; For 
schools, participation in 
school development 
projects 
Funding of groups and 
funding of school textbooks. 
Grants to women’s groups 
appear to have had little 
effect on the capacities or 
size of women’s groups; 
grants to governing 
committees of schools and 
increases in textbook 
funding  were associated 
with increased participation 
of parents in school 
development; additional 
effects were found for 
textbook funding 
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TABLE 4: STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 








Adults in US  Access to time and 
financial assistance from 
relatives and friends 
Previous provision of time and 
financial assistance to those 
same relatives and friends 
Time and assistance from 
friends is predicted by past 
provision, but not time and 






Density of community 
organizations 
Rapid industrialization within 
district 
Industrialization, if 
anything was associated 
with rising density of 




some declines, possibly due 
to out-migration 
Oliver (1999)  Adults in US  Local civic participation  Community affluence and 
associated levels of social 
needs, competition for 
resources induced by 
population heterogeneity  
Heterogeneous, middle 
income cities exhibit higher 
levels of civic participation 
than heterogeneous, 
affluent cities 
Paxton (1999)  Adults in US  Trust, participation in 
various associations 
Time  No strong evidence of 
declines in social capital in 
the US since the 1970’s 
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TABLE 4: STUDIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION AND THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 







Adults in US  Trust in local government  Measures of political 
institutions, political culture, 
income inequality, ethnic 
fractionalization, ideological 
polarization, controls for 
individual characteristics 
Ideological polarization,  
income inequality, and 
political culture are more 
important and political 
institutions in explaining 




Adults in Chicago  Intergenerational closure, 
reciprocal social exchange, 
and shared expectations for 
informal social control 
Miscellaneous neighborhood 
characteristics 
Residential stability and 
relative affluence predict 
intergenerational social 
closure and reciprocal 
exchange, whereas 
neighborhood disadvantage 
predicts low expectations of 
shared child control 
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